

## War In The Falklands Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

*This book offers an empirically informed understanding of how identity and agency become wholly embedded within practices of media-remembering. It draws upon data collected from the British military, the BBC and Falkland Islanders during the 30th Anniversary of the Falklands war to uniquely offer multiple perspectives on a single 'remembering' phenomenon. The study offers an analysis of the convergence, interconnectedness and interdependence of media and remembering, specifically the production, interpretation and negotiation of remembering in the media ecology. In so doing it not only examines the role of media in the formation and sustaining of collective memory but also the ways those who remember or are remembered in media texts become implicated in these processes.*

*"The Falklands War: a war over a wintry archipelago that was home to an unprofitable colony? Could the Falklands War, in fact, have been a last-ditch revival of Britain's imperial past? Despite widespread conjecture about the imperial dimensions of the Falklands War, this is the first history of the conflict from the transnational perspective of the British world. Taking Britain's painful process of decolonisation as his starting point, Ezequiel Mercau shows how the Falklands lobby helped revive the idea of a 'British world', transforming a minor squabble into a full-blown war. Boasting original perspectives on the Falklanders, the Four Nations and the Anglo-Argentines, and based on a wealth of unseen material, he sheds new light on the British world, Thatcher's Britain, devolution, immigration and political culture. His findings show that neither the dispute, the war, nor its aftermath can be divorced from the ongoing legacies of empire"*

*This book explores the Falklands War from an Argentinian perspective, taking into consideration three aspects. First, it introduces classified documents after the end of the thirty-year ban. Second, it highlights various conceptual, institutional, and doctrinal reforms in the Argentinian and other South American armed forces as a result of lessons learned from the Malvinas War. Third, it reflects on the war's long-term implications on Argentina's foreign policy and society. The book offers the first comprehensive, multi-level analysis, and Argentinian scholarship on the conflict. It is based on original primary data, mainly official documentation and interviews with military officers and combatants.*

*This book is based on a conference at Sandhurst Military College held to re-examine the events in the Falklands of spring 1982. It is a mix of those who participated in the event with historians, political scientists and journalists.*

**An Imperial History**

**Predicting International Conflict with Mass Media Indicators**

**A Political Perspective**

**The SAS in the Falklands War**

**A Matter of Life and Death**

Panoramic, transnational history of the Falklands War and its imperial dimensions, which explores how a minor squabble mushroomed into war.

Master's Thesis from the year 2016 in the subject Politics - Region Middle- and South America, grade 1.5, University of Leicester (Department of Politics and International Relations), language: English, abstract: One spectrum of the orthodox narrative of the Malvinas campaign in 1982 implies that Argentina 's loss originated with its megalomaniac leadership. Their supposedly erratic moves cost the country 649 lives and caused national humiliation, but also initiated the process that terminated dictatorship. The other spectrum recognises a decisive, if hard-won, military success that turned into Margaret Thatcher 's landslide re-election victory. This orthodox narrative, however, burrs a thorough analysis of the war, because it misinterprets its causes. This study moves the analysis into uncharted waters by investigating the alliance between Britain and Chile during the war. Chile 's effort was significant insofar as it helped to keep British losses down and provided intelligence that eventually led to the decision to sink the Belgrano. Britain, as part of the deal, transferred arms to Chile and helped to brush up the Pinochet dictatorship 's image abroad. Thus sustaining it through its most precarious period, the severe economic crisis of 1982. Theoretical input by offensive realism and neo-Marxism provides the overall frame. Both are structural theories with particular focus on soil and territory. Chapter 2 distils prevalent aspects of both approaches and defends their use over agency-based theories like social constructivism and interpretivism. Chapter three is the entry point into Southern Cone geopolitics as it analyses the defining events of Chilean-Argentine relations: the Pacific War of 1879-1883 and the Beagle Crisis in 1978. After Chapter four will have put these events in perspective the unorthodox conclusion emerges, arguing that the Falklands War was not an attack on British sovereignty per se but a move against Chile to obtain hegemony in the South Atlantic.

This book traces the interaction of war and diplomacy and analyzes why the Falklands conflict of 1982 engaged the British and Argentine people in a deeply personal way. It also examines the interpretation of the war in Britain, revealing how the war--a successful one--was seen by critics as an example of "Thatcher's Britain." This "small war" exemplified what one historian calls "the myriad forms of war" and had--and has--resonances larger than its size.

"The Falklands/Malvinas crisis of the spring of 1982 concerning sovereignty over the islands offers classic examples of multilateral, bilateral, and third-party mediation of international conflict. The United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, United States shuttle diplomacy, Peruvian conciliation efforts, and the UN Secretary General interventions failed to avert bloodshed. The armed conflict grew out of a long history of territorial dispute and was also rooted in the failure of Britain and Argentina to resolve their differences after many years of bilateral diplomatic negotiations. The conflict had developed in three main areas of contention. The first concerned the legal aspect and the claims to sovereignty of both Britain and Argentina to the Falklands. Another was Argentina's constant diplomatic pressure in pursuing its claims to the islands. The third referred to the practical aspects for Britain of maintaining sovereignty and to their attempts to find an equitable way to relinquish it while assuring that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders would be respected. In 1826 Argentina resettled the islands and in 1833 the British evicted the Argentines. The UN, in 1965, passed a resolution which called for Britain and Argentina to proceed with negotiations to settle the sovereignty issue. These negotiations were carried on until 1982 without resolution of the problem. A new round of negotiations began in March of 1982. The Argentine ruling junta claimed that the negotiations had broken down and they asserted that they would press their claim by other than peaceful means. A month later Argentina invaded the islands to reassert their claims of sovereignty. The US third-party mediation effort began a week later and the effort was characterized by shuttle diplomacy which took place in Buenos Aires, London and Washington, D.C. At the end of the month, Secretary of State Haig announced that the United States would provide support requested by the British. The Peruvian government worked very hard in parallel with the US diplomacy to put an end to the crisis. The UN Security Council and the Organization of American States OAS led to an end to hostilities and a withdrawal of forces on both sides. The OAS supported the Argentine position. Crisis management efforts in Britain were under the Foreign Office and involved round-the-clock participation of key governmental, military, and civilian agencies. The U.S. Interagency group was formed at the Department of State and was composed of representatives of the various State Department functional and geographical bureaus and the Pentagon, Central Intelligence Agency CIA, and the National Security Agency NSA liaisons were activated. On April 5, 1982, Britain sent a large naval force to the Falklands. The diplomats among the shuttle diplomacy knew, that once the task force arrived in the vicinity of the Falklands, that whatever diplomatic efforts were ongoing would be overtaken by them. The troops went well ashore on East Falkland Island on May 21. The British and Argentine press were very partisan and nationalistic themes were evident on both sides. Argentine preparations for their invasion were formulated rather rapidly and the army command structure, supply system, and training were inadequate to the task of securing the islands militarily [sic]. Munitions were in comparatively short supply, but had been procured from many diverse sources, and additional armaments were not available in the pipeline. The Argentine Navy lost the cruiser Belgrano early in the conflict and thereafter seldom ventured out of port. Argentine airpower was the main threat and performed well [sic]. The pilots were ill-trained, the Exocet guided missile was effective, and the tactics and techniques they employed were professionally executed. The British were ill-prepared to fight in an area far from home. Ascension Island which was about half the distance to the war zone, was used as a refueling stop and US logistical and fuel support was vital. The British land units were very effective and were better than their Argentine counterparts. The local population was not harmed by the military operations. The British Navy performed well and the use of improved technology in radar, munitions, helicopter carriers, intelligence, and warning systems would have been helpful. In the post-war period the British improved the airport at Port Stanley and 4,500 soldiers were stationed there to guard a population of approximately 1,500. The British wanted to reduce tensions. The Argentines sought negotiations with sovereignty and the British refused to have negotiations without sovereignty. In the Argentine view, the situation remained unchanged."--Document.

A Christian Perspective on War

The Battle for the Falklands

The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War

Views From The United States

Revisiting the Falklands-Malvinas Question

A Rifle Company Commander's Perspective

*Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, "jointness," and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower. Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict.*

*Provides new light on the way the Argentine forces were organized for war, the plans and reactions of the commanders, the sufferings of the soldiers and the shame and disillusionment of defeat. Martin Middlebrook has produced a genuine 'first' with this unique work. Martin Middlebrook is the only British historian to have been granted open access to the Argentines who planned and fought the Falklands War. It ranks with Liddel Hart's The Other side of the Hill in analyzing and understanding the military thinking and strategies of Britain's sometime enemy, and is essential reading for all who wish to understand the workings of military minds. The book provides new light on the way Argentine forces were organized for war, the plans and reactions of the commanders, the sufferings of the soldiers and the shame and disillusionment of defeat.*

*First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.*

*Cites over 800 substantial books, document collections, and journal articles about the diplomatic, military, and political aspects of the 1982 war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands; newspaper articles and works less than about 2,000 words are not included. Most of the works cited are in English or Spanish, giving British or Argentine perspectives, but other American and European views are also cited. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR*

*International Perspectives on the Falklands Conflict*

*War in the Falklands*

*Falklands and Malvinas*

*The Falklands-Malvinas Conflict*

*The Early Twenty-First Century Malvinas*

"Almost forty years after the Falklands War, the causes and consequences of the military conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982 still reverberate. The archipelago that makes up the Falkland-Malvinas Islands is surrounded by complexities and antagonisms—including controversy around its very name. This book interrogates the conflict with approaches from history, political science, sociology, film, and cultural studies. Additionally, this collection brings together English, Spanish, and Argentine specialists and researchers. It includes testimony from war veterans and exiles, essays on the films of Julio Cardozo, and Argentine patriotism as witnessed in contemporary literature and pedagogy. By taking up these different perspectives, Revisiting the Falklands-Malvinas Question moves beyond traditional approaches to the conflict based on nationalism, geopolitics, or military achievements, leading to a more expansive discussion."--Publisher description.

Most individuals realise that we have a moral obligation to avoid the evils of war. But this realization raises a host of difficult questions when we, as responsible individuals, witness harrowing injustices such as "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia or starvation in Somalia. With millions of lives at stake, is war ever justified? And, if so, for what purpose? In this book, Richard J. Regan confronts these controversial questions by first considering the basic principles of just-war theory and then applying those principles to historical and ongoing conflicts. Part One presents two opposing viewpoints: first, that war is not subject to moral norms and, second, that war is never morally permissible. The author rejects both perspectives, and moves to define the principles of just-war theory. He evaluates the roles of the president, Congress and, most importantly, the UN Security Council in determining when long-term US military involvement is justified. The moral limits of war conduct and the moral problem of using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons are also discussed. On the just cause to wage war, Regan argues that nations and nationals - whether in self-defense or in defense of others - remains the "only" classical cause that in the modern world would justify resorting to war. With respect to military intervention in secessionist and revolutionary wars, he contends that such intervention might be justified, but that prudence dictates extreme caution. In considering acceptable war conduct, Regan elaborates the specific principle of discrimination and proportionality; he maintains that civilians uninvolved in the enemy's war should not be directly targeted and that the costs of military action must be proportionate to the anticipated benefits of destroying military targets. The second part of the book presents case studies of eight historical wars - World War I, the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, the revolution and civil war in Nicaragua, the civil war in El Salvador, the Gulf War, the intervention in Somalia, and the Bosnian War - and poses several provocative questions about each. It invites readers and students to apply just-war principles to complex war-related situations and to understand the factual contingencies involved in moral judgments about war decisions. The book should be of particular interest to students of the moral issues of international relations and to readers interested more generally in philosophy, theology and political science.

Contains analyses of the war by several prominent U.S. experts on national security affairs. Their observations reflect the continuing debate on such key issues in U.S. defence planning - and in Soviet defence planning as well - as the controversy over large versus small carriers, the advantages and dis advantages of a diesel-versus nuclear-powered submarine fleet, the effectiveness of the Harrier-type aircraft, the influence of high technology on amphibious warfare, and the ever increasing use of 'smart' weapons by all-purpose conventional armed forces.

This book about the Falklands/Malvinas conflict centres on the war and its consequences, but from an oblique perspective that brings together English, Spanish and Argentine specialists and researchers. It aims to be an objective and reflective book. It does not approach the topic from the perspective of the war or national sentiment, neither is it an essay. The book is novel in that different social scientists analyse the theme from the perspective of their own disciplines. It combines approaches from history, political science, journalism, literature, film, sociology and cultural studies in general. Through taking different perspectives, which cut across each other and dialogue, it moves beyond traditional approaches to the conflict based on nationalism, geopolitics or military achievements.

After the Falklands

Getting to War

Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the Falklands

Just War

A Nursing Memoir of The Falklands War

The Falklands War

First published in 1985, The Falklands War was the first comprehensive work of its kind. The book brings together a wealth of work by scholars and practitioners in the fields of diplomacy, military affairs, and international politics and law. It provides a comprehensive and objective overview of the Falklands War and the underlying crisis that continued following it. This volume is a detailed study suitable for anyone wishing to expand their knowledge of the Falklands War. Explores how women playwrights illuminate the contemporary world and contribute to its reshaping

While many books have been written on the Falklands War, this is the first to focus on the vital aspect of logistics. The challenges were huge; the lack of preparation time; the urgency; the huge distances involved; the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four.??After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina's invasion the book describes in detail the rush to re-organise and deploy forces, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the Task Force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theatre resupply, the setbacks and finally the restoring of order after victory.??Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties etc.??The lessons learnt have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs and this book fills an important gap.

This is a collection of important new work on the Falklands Conflict by the leading authorities in the field, British and Argentine. The themes of the volume are defence and diplomacy, and the problematic relationship between them. The authors investigate aspects of the conflict from the relevance of Falklands/Malvinas past, through the diplomatic and military crisis of 1982, to shifts in public opinion in both countries. Contributors include Peter Beck, Peter Calvert, Lawrence Freedman, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Guillermo Makin and Paul Rogers.

Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Plays by Women

War In The Falklands: Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

White Ship Red Crosses

The Fight for the 'Malvinas'

Argentine Fight for the Falklands

Air Power in the Falklands Conflict

*This monograph addresses the Malvinas/Falklands conflict from the Argentine perspective. Leaders must understand all sides of narratives in armed conflicts. Existing Anglo-American literature does not reflect the complete narrative associated with the conflict. This does not mean that what has been written is not true, but that the Argentine view has not been captured effectively. This conflict escalated into war between Argentina and Great Britain between April and June of 1982, but the outcome of that war did not solve the problem. The author is an Argentine Army Aviator Officer who wants to take a balanced and objective view. The Anglo-American view interprets the Argentine behavior as an invasion, the Argentines' view is perceived as a recovery of the Islands without bloodshed after 149 years of persistent claims. From the Argentine view the war was triggered by Great Britain with the British decision to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano on 2nd May 1982, outside of the theater of operations, causing the deaths of more than three hundred Argentine sailors. Until that point in the conflict, Great Britain had suffered no casualties in the Argentine recovery of the Islands. The Malvinas/Falklands conflict includes issues about sovereignty, colonialism, and diplomatic misunderstandings. If the conflict reignites, it has the propensity and the potentiality to transmit the issues latent in the Argentine domestic conflict to the entire South American region, acting against the interests of the United States and the values of partnership in the international community.*

*With the sudden Argentine invasion of the remote Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 the United Kingdom found itself at war. Due to the resolve of a determined Prime Minister and the resourcefulness of the Armed Forces, a Task Force, code named Operation CORPORATE, was quickly dispatched. Remarkably just over two months later, the Islands were liberated and the invaders defeated. By any standards this was a remarkable feat of all arms cooperation made possible by political resolve, sound planning, strong leadership and the courage and determination of the combatants. Martin Middlebrook, one of the most skillful historians of the 20th Century, has weaved the many strands of this extraordinary military achievement into a fascinating, thorough and highly readable account of the Campaign. For a full understanding of what it took to win this war there will be no better account to read than this.*

*An account by the only British historian to have been granted open access to the Argentines who planned and fought the Falklands War. Avoiding involvement in the issue of sovereignty and concentrating entirely upon the military story, this history is a unique and balanced look at the 1982 war for the islands that the UK called the Falklands and Argentina called the Malvinas, a ten-week conflict that killed nearly a thousand people. Among the men the author met were the captain of the ship that took the scrap-metal merchants to South Georgia; the admiral in charge of planning the Falklands invasion; the marine commander and other members of the invasion force; two brigadier-generals, five unit commanders, and many other men of the large army force sent to occupy and defend the islands; the officer in charge of the Argentine garrison at Goose Green; and, finally, the brigadier-general responsible for the defense of Port Stanley and soldiers of all ranks who fought the final battles.*

*Using four warship-centered examples, this book shows how naval battles are won or lost—and how technological advantage is rarely as decisive in defeat or victory as is often claimed. • Focuses on four ship-centered battle narratives: the battle of Trafalgar, the battle of Jutland, the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, and the Falklands War • Identifies 11 perspectives that explain victory and defeat in naval operations • Provides a history-based survey of successful naval operations while highlighting the nature of naval operations in the 21st century • Presents information written in a clear, reader-friendly style without compromising on its scholarly standards of content and accuracy • Offers fascinating reading for naval college students, general audiences who enjoy naval history, and naval historians alike*

*The Falkland Islands War*

*The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On*

*The Argentine Perspective of the Falkland's Conflict*

*Transnational and Interdisciplinary Perspectives*

*Background, Conflict, Aftermath : an Annotated Bibliography*

*A Reader*

*The Battle for the Falklands is a thoughtful and informed analysis of an astonishing chapter in modern British history from journalist and military historian Sir Max Hastings and political editor Simon Jenkins. Ten weeks, 28,000 soldiers, 8,000 miles from home. The Falklands War in 1982 was one of the strangest in British history. At the time, many Britons saw it as a tragic absurdity - thousands of men sent overseas for a tiny relic of empire - but the British victory over the Argentnians not only confirmed the quality of British arms but also boosted the political fortunes of Thatcher's Conservative government. However, it left a chequered aftermath and was later overshadowed by the two Gulf wars. Max Hastings' and Simon Jenkins' account of the conflict is a modern classic of war reportage and the definitive book on the conflict.*

**War In The Falklands: Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power****Pickle Partners Publishing**

*Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, 'Jointness, and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower, Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict.*

*A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command. In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.*

*Perspectives on British Strategy and Use of Air Power*

*The Story of Naval Party 8901*

*Logistics in the Falklands War*

*Not Part of the Game? The Anglo-Chilean Alliance of the Falklands War*

*The Falklands War – There and Back Again*

*Understanding Victory: Naval Operations from Trafalgar to the Falklands*

On 1 April 1982 Major Mike Norman, commander of Naval Party 8901, was looking forward to a peaceful yearlong tour of duty on the Falkland Islands. But events turned out differently, for the next day the Argentines invaded and he and his forty-three Royal Marines found themselves fighting for their lives. They took up defensive positions around Government House and on the approach to Stanley from Cape Pembroke to protect the Governor Rex Hunt and delay the advance to Stanley. They were prepared to die executing his orders. After a desperate battle in the gardens and even inside the house against superior numbers Rex Hunt ordered them to lay down their arms. As the surrender took place, an Argentine told a marine: The islands are ours now. The response was simple: We will be back. They were, and this is their story.The Royal Marines of Naval Party 8901 as well as some members of the previous detachment volunteered to join the Task Force and, some seventy-five days later, the men who witnessed the raising of the Argentine flag over the islands on 2 April saw the triumphant return of the Union Jack.Mike Normans dramatic account draws on his own vivid recollections, the log recording the defense of Government House, the testimony of the marines under his command and newly released files from government archives. It is a powerful and moving tribute to the marines who confronted the Argentines when they invaded and then fought to free their island.

The Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 ended hundreds of British and Argentine lives on the islands, many of them very young, and definitively contributed to the later deaths of many ex-combatants. It rained or adversely affected the lives of many thousands more survivors and military relatives. It put a stop to the patient diplomacy which had preceded it, and resoundingly consolidated the popular appeal of the UK Thatcher government, thus helping to ensure the dominance of right-wing Conservative administrations in the UK for another fifteen years. In Argentina, it contributed to the downfall of a terrorist dictatorship and gave the country a chance to follow a less frightening democratic path. It galvanized more serious and concerted efforts to address the problems of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and led to the creation of new model networks for veteran peer support. Neither side really won anything concrete by means of it, although the residents of the Islands themselves undoubtedly gained in military security, financial subsidy and political attention. Otherwise it is largely a sad tale of loss, grief, suffering and waste. This Reader selects, forty years after the war, some of the most vital writing about it. It tends, without partisanship, towards evaluating the

War in moral and political, humane and socially consequential terms, of the kind with which military historians and short-term-perspective politicians tend not to concern themselves. It likewise inclines towards remembering the War as an event in which identifiable individuals, or their friends and comrades, suffered and died, rather than simply viewing these many participants as anonymous pawns on a geopolitical chess board. While providing general factual commentary and discussion on the causes, events, consequences of and continuing debate about the War, it additionally gives considerable space to accounts of what it was like, experientially, to have been a combatant on either side in the conflict. It also takes into consideration the ways in which the War has been mediated in news, literature, film and television. The anthology therefore represents the variety of discourses to be found in the existing archive of writing about the dispute, encompassing diplomatic communications, historical accounts, personal memoirs, impassioned polemics and academic analyses originating in various disciplines.

I en række afhandlinger gennemgås en række vigtige erfaringer fra Falklandskrigen, set ud fra et amerikansk synspunkt.

From the television footage shown in all its stark reality and the daily coverage and subsequent memoirs, the impression delivered from the air battles in the Falklands Conflict was that of heroic Argentine pilots who relentlessly pressed home their attacks against the British. While, by contrast, there is a counter-narrative that portrayed the Sea Harrier force as being utterly dominant over its Argentine enemies. But what was the reality of the air war over the Falkland Islands? While books on the air operations have published since that time, they have, in the main, been personal accounts, re-told by those who were there, fighting at a tactical level, or back in their nations' capital turning the strategic implications of the outcome. But a detailed analysis of the operational level of the air war has not been undertaken until now. At the same time, some analysts have inferred that this Cold War sideshow offers little insight into lessons for the operating environment of future conflicts. As the author demonstrates in this book, there are lessons from 1982 that do have important and continued relevance today. Using recently released primary source material, the author, a serving RAF officer who spent two-and-a-half years in the Falklands as an air defence navigator,

has taken an impartial look at the air campaign at the operational level. This has enabled him to develop a considered view of what should have occurred, comparing it with what actually happened. In so doing, John Shields has produced a comprehensive account of the air campaign that has demolished many of the enduring myths. This is the story of not why, but how the air war was fought over the skies of the South Atlantic.

Media, Memory and Identity

Lessons of the Falklands War, 1982

An Operational Level Insight into Air Warfare in the South Atlantic

Remembering the Falklands War

The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on

The Falklands War, 1982

*This book shows how to predict wars. More specifically, it tells us how to anticipate in a timely fashion the scope and extent of interstate conflict. By focusing on how all governments—democratic or not—seek to secure public support before undertaking risky moves such as starting a war, Getting to War provides a methodology for identifying a regime's intention to launch a conflict well in advance of the actual initiation. The goal here is the identification of leading indicators of war. Getting to War develops such a leading political indicator by a systematic examination of the ways in which governments influence domestic and international information flows. Regardless of the relative openness of the media system in question, we can accurately gauge the underlying interests of those governments by a systematic analysis of opinion-leading articles in the mass media. This analysis allows us to predict both the likelihood of conflict and what form of conflict—military or diplomatic/economic—will occur. Theoretically, this book builds on a forty-year-old insight by Karl Deutsch—that all governments seek to mobilize public opinion through mass media and that careful analysis of such domestic media activity could provide an "early warning network" of international conflict. By showing how to tap the link between conflict initiation and public support, this book provides both a useful tool for understanding crisis behavior as well as new theoretical insights on how domestic politics help drive foreign policy. Getting to War will be of interest to political scientists who study international disputes and national security as well as social scientists interested in media studies and political communication. General readers with an interest in military or diplomatic history—particularly U.S. history—will find that Getting to War provides an entirely new perspective on how to understand wars and international crises. W. Ben Hunt is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University*

*With the sudden Argentine invasion of the remote Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982 the United Kingdom found itself at war. Due to the resolve of a determined Prime Minister and the resourcefulness of the Armed Forces, a Task Force, code named Operation CORPORATE, was quickly dispatched. Remarkably just over two months later, the Islands were liberated and the invaders defeated. By any standards this was a remarkable feat of all arms cooperation made possible by political resolve, sound planning, strong leadership and the courage and determination of the combatants.Martin Middlebrook, one of the most skillful historians of the 20th Century, has weaved the many strands of this extraordinary military achievement into a fascinating, thorough and highly readable account of the Campaign.For a full understanding of what it took to win this war there will be no better account to read than this.*

*In early summer, 1982 - winter in the South Atlantic - Argentina's military invaded the Falklands. Within days a British Royal Navy Task Force is assembled and dispatched. This is the story of D Squadron, 22 SAS, commanded by Cedric Deeds. The relentless tempo of events defies belief. Raging seas, insupportable glaciers, hurricane-force winds, helicopter crashes, raids behind enemy lines--the Squadron prevailed against them all, but the cost was high. Eight died and more were wounded or captured. Holding fast to their humanity, D Squadron's fighters were there at the start and end of the Falklands War, the first to raise a Union Jack over Government House in Stanley. Across an Angry Sea is a story of daring, skill and steadfastness among a tight-knit band of brothers; of going away, learning fast, fighting hard, and winning through.*

*"As I traced the words of that remarkable ship during my 11 year visit, I found all of my seriously wounded soldiers who had been helicoptered off the battle's ead, some of whom I thought I would never see again, and saw for myself the inspirational care of the Naval medical and nursing staff that had saved lives and on which recovery was depending. It was hardly a mile off shore, but I felt a very long way from Mount Tumbledown." Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely KCB, MC, Company Commander in 2nd Battalion Scots Guards 1982 "These are the personal stories of the injured servicemen and the Naval Nurses and Doctors who fought the all-important battle to bring them back alive." Brian Hanrahan BBC War Correspondent during The Falklands War 1982 "The story of dedication and courage on The Hospital Ship Uganda. Author Nicci Pugh honours all those who were treated and served on board Her Majesty's Hospital Ship Uganda during the Falklands War 1982." Michael Nicholson CBE, ITN War Correspondent during the Falklands War 1982 "Nicci Pugh is to be congratulated on weaving together the threads of this hidden side of the Falklands conflict. A success story emerges of inter-service co-operation, which shows what can be achieved when there is no precedent to follow. White Ship - Red Crosses explains why The Hospital Ship Uganda became such a reassuring presence to those fi ghting in the South Atlantic in 1982." Captain Grahame A. Burton RD\* FNI In 1982 P&O Chief Officer.SS Uganda and LI Cdr RNR "Not before time, the story of the Naval nursing staff on board The Hospital Ship Uganda is being told. My own memories are vague regarding much of the early days after the bombing of the R Galahad, but nothing detracts from the comfort and security I felt as I was cared for and nursed on board The Hospital Ship at that time. Much has been written regarding the battles and the soldier's point of view during the Falklands War, but the perspective of the medical teams has often been overlooked and ignored. This is a story that needs to be told and listened to, not just because it is a great book and a very good read but because of its powerful message. White Ship - Red Crosses is a triumph for all injured servicemen but let's not forget the tributes deserved by those unrelentingly hard-working nurses and medical teams, without whom my survival would not have been possible. Author Nicci Pugh, who worked as an Operating Theatre Sister in the midst of the casualties as they arrived on board The Hospital Ship Uganda in 1982 has captured the whole essence of treating and caring for the casualties on a mass scale in a war zone." Simon Weston CBE Former patient on board Her Majesty's Hospital Ship Uganda. This is a story that needs to be told." Simon Weston CBE*

*Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law*

*Lessons for the Future*

*Principles and Cases*

*Perspectives on the Anglo-Argentine Conflict*

*Across an Angry Sea*

*The Falklands/Malvinas War in the South Atlantic*