

Us Involvement And Escalation Guided Reading

The antiDVietnam War movement marked the first time in American history that record numbers marched and protested to an antiwar tune_on college campuses, in neighborhoods, and in Washington. Although it did not create enough pressure on decision-makers to end U.S. involvement in the war, the movement's impact was monumental. It served as a major constraint on the government's ability to escalate, played a significant role in President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision in 1968 not to seek another term, and was a factor in the Watergate affair that brought down President Richard Nixon. At last, the story of the entire antiwar movement from its advent to its dissolution is available in Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds . Author Melvin Small describes not only the origins and trajectory of the antiDVietnam War movement in America, but also focuses on the way it affected policy and public opinion and the way it in turn was affected by the government and the media, and, consequently, events in Southeast Asia. Leading this crusade were outspoken cultural rebels including Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, as passionate about the cause as the music that epitomizes the period. But in addition to radical protestors whose actions fueled intense media coverage, Small reveals that the anti-war movement included a diverse cast of ordinary citizens turned war dissenter: housewives, politicians, suburbanites, clergy members, and the elderly. The antiwar movement comes to life in this compelling new book that is sure to fascinate all those interested in the Vietnam War and the turbulent, tumultuous 1960s.

Retracing the confused pattern of planning for escalation of the Vietnam War, Moise reconstructs the events of the night of August 4, 1964, when the U.S. Navy destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy reported that they were under attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. Using declassified records and interviews with the participants, Moise demonstrates that there was no North Vietnamese attack; the original report was a genuine mistake.

Analysing policy documents from nine counterinsurgency wars, Elias asks why powerful militaries have difficulty managing local partners. Revealing a critical political dynamic in military interventions, this book will appeal to academics and policymakers addressing counterinsurgency issues in foreign policy, security studies and political science.

Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced then-use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived at and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.

American Nation Building in South Vietnam

RAND in Southeast Asia

The British and the Vietnam War

Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam

Implications for Decision Making

A Different Kind of War

The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam

An overview of the revisionist case on the Vietnam War, showing how it could have been won by the US at a lower cost than was suffered in defeat.

"Masterful. . . . Logevall presents a vivid and tragic portrait of the elements of U.S. decision-making on Vietnam from the beginning of the Kennedy administration through the announcement of the American ground war in July 1965. In the process he reveals a troubling picture of top officials in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations persisting in efforts to boost the fortunes of successors that their chances for success were remote. In addition, he places the decision-making squarely in the international context."—Robert D. Schulzinger, author of A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 "Stunning in its research and highly sophisticated in its analysis, Choosing War is far and away the best study we have of Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the conflict in Vietnam. . . . offers the first detailed examination of why diplomacy failed to head off the Vietnam War. Grounding himself in documentary research and other sources from several countries, Logevall comes closer than anyone ever has to explaining what happened. His clear writing and deep analysis may well change our understanding of Vietnam as a quagmire."—John Prados, author of The Hidden History of Vietnam "Fredrik Logevall has written the most important Vietnam book in years. By explaining the international context of that tragic conflict, Choosing War provides startling answers to the question, Why did the war happen? Controversial yet fair, this account challenges the reader to think through John F. Kennedy's and Lydon B. Johnson's individual responsibility for Vietnam. The effect is close to that of "One Hell of a Gamble:" Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964

An essential guide to the Vietnam war that takes the story through to 1975 and the North Vietnamese victory. Provides fresh insight into the role of other major powers, in particular Chinaand the Soviet Union Contains enhanced detail in areas such as American military and political decision-making: as well as clarifying the Vietnamese Communists political decisions and conduct throughout the war documents, chronology, glossary, guide to characters and a detailed bibliography Experience Vietnam War in a whole new way. There has never been a Vietnam War Guide like this. It contains 194 answers, much more than you can imagine: comprehensive answers and extensive details and references, with insights that have never before been offered in print. Get the information you need--fast! This all-embracing guide offers a thorough view of key knowledge and detailed insight into the Vietnam War. A quick look inside of some of the subjects covered: Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War - American soldiers, 2nd Marine Division (Republic of Korea) - After the Vietnam War, Park Chung-hee - Vietnam War, Vietnam War POW/MIA issue - POW/MIA activist organizations, Joan Baez - Vietnam War, CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwh Vietnam War (1954-1975), Opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War - Public opinion, Batutut - Sightings during the Vietnam War, Aerial refueling - Vietnam War, Role of the United States in the Vietnam War - Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945), 75th Ranger Regiment - Vietnam War, Canada and the Vietnam War - Beginnings, Aircraft losses of the Vietnam War - Republic of Vietnam aircraft losses - Vietnam War - 1971 and after, Loadmaster - 1960s, the Vietnam War, and 1970s, Headhunting - Vietnam War, Opposition to the Vietnam War - American soldiers, 9th Infantry Regiment (United States) - Vietnam War, 4th Fighter Wing - Vietnam War, Vietnam War - Opposition to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War: 1962-1973, Aircraft losses of the Vietnam War - USAF fixed-wing, Frederick C. Weyand - Vietnam War escalation, 1963-69, Vietnam War POW/MIA issue - In the 2000s, and much more...

Balancing Societal and Individual Benefits and Risks of Prescription Opioid Use

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Their Way with LBJ

Escalation And Intervention

Dereliction of Duty

The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War

The Logic of Withdrawal

More than a quarter of a century after the last Marine Corps Huey left the American embassy in Saigon, the lessons and legacies of the most divisive war in twentieth-century American history are as hotly debated as ever. Why did successive administrations choose little-known Vietnam as the "test case" of American commitment in the fight against communism? Why were the "best and brightest" apparently blind to the illegitimacy of the state of South Vietnam? Would Kennedy have pulled out had he lived? And what lessons regarding American foreign policy emerged from the war? The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War helps readers understand this tragic and complex conflict. The book contains both interpretive information and a wealth of facts in easy-to-find form. Part I provides a lucid narrative overview of contested issues and interpretations in Vietnam scholarship. Part II is a mini-encyclopedia with descriptions and analysis of individuals, events, groups, and military operations. Arranged alphabetically, this section enables readers to look up isolated facts and specialized terms. Part III is a chronology of key events. Part IV is an annotated guide to resources, including films, documentaries, CD-ROMs, and reliable Web sites. Part V contains excerpts from historical documents and statistical data.

, China, and communist parties throughout the world.

For years, the so-called better-war school of thought has argued that the United States built a legitimate and viable non-Communist state in South Vietnam in the latter years of the Vietnam War and that it was only the military abandonment of this state that brought down the Republic of Vietnam. But Andrew J. Gawthorpe, through a detailed and incisive analysis, shows that, in fact, the United States failed in its efforts at nation building and had not established a durable state in South Vietnam. Drawing on newly opened archival collections and previously unexamined oral histories with dozens of U.S. military officers and government officials, To Build as Well as Destroy demonstrates that the United States never came close to achieving victory in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Gawthorpe tells a story of policy aspirations and practical failures that stretches from Washington, D.C., to the Vietnamese villages in which the United States implemented its nationbuilding strategy through the Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support known as CORDS. Structural factors that could not have been overcome by the further application of military power thwarted U.S. efforts to build a viable set of non-Communist political, economic, and social institutions in South Vietnam. To Build as Well as Destroy provides the most comprehensive account yet of the largest and best-resourced nation-building program in U.S. history. Gawthorpe's analysis helps contemporary policy makers, diplomats, and military officers understand the reasons for this failure. At a moment in time when American strategists are grappling with military and political challenges in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, revisiting the historical lessons of Vietnam is a worthy endeavor.

During the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, the British government sought to avoid escalation of the war in Vietnam and to help bring about peace. The thinking that lay behind these endeavours was often insightful and it is hard to argue that the attempt was not worth making, but the British government was able to exert little, if any, influence on a power with which it believed it had, and needed, a special relationship. Drawing on little-used papers in the British archives, Nicholas Taring describes the making of Britain's Vietnam policy during a period when any compromise proposed by London was likely to be seen in Washington as suggestive of defeat, and attempts to involve Moscow in the process over-estimated the USSR's influence on a Hanoi determined on reunification.

The Complete Idiot's Guide to the Vietnam War

Why We Always Fight the Last Battle

A Grand Delusion: America's Descent Into Vietnam

Multilateral Security And Its Alternatives

The Irony of Vietnam

The United States, China, and Taiwan

Vietnam

The next U.S. administration should require women ' s representation and meaningful participation in conflict resolution and postconflict processes, increase investment in efforts that promote women ' s inclusion, reform U.S. diplomatic and security practices to incorporate the experiences of women in conflict-affected countries, improve staffing and coordination to deliver on government commitments, strengthen training on incorporating women in security efforts, and promote accountability. T hese steps will help the United States respond effectively to security threats around the world, improve the sustainability of peace agreements, and advance U.S. interests.

Why did the US make a commitment to an independent South Vietnam? Could a major war have been averted? Fredrik Logevall provides a concise, comprehensive and accessible introduction to the origins of the Vietnam War from the end of the Indochina War in 1954 to the eruption of full-scale war in 1965, and places events against their full international background.

A narrative history and assessment of the early years of Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, including McNamara's relationship with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the transformation of the Department of Defense as a part of Kennedy's New Frontier, and the Pentagon's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs episode, and onset of the Vietnam War along with other major national security events and developments during a turbulent and momentous period of the Cold War. (Fuller description is on the dust jacket flaps.)

Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject History Europe - Other Countries - Newer History, European Unification, grade: 1,7, Univesity Pierre-Mend è s-France (Institut des Etudes Politiques), course: Cours sp é cialis é , 11 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: Since the beginning of the escalation of the Vietnam War politicians and scientists are discussing the reasons for this intensification of military action. One can find as much theories as theorists. In the following I will present the most important and disseminated concepts. To create a foundation for my presentation I will shortly describe the chronology of the events which frame the escalation and the escalation itself. After that I will at first present the official, government explanation for the escalation, which is based on the containment of Communist aggression. Subsequent to that I will portray the two most important theories: the 'Quagmire Theory' and the 'Stalemate Theory'. Furthermore some analysts saw the dilemma in the personality and the authority of the American Presidents. At least there is the idea that the escalation was a result of political and economical interests of the USA. Finally I will finish my work with my own conclusion about the intervention in the Vietnam War and its escalation.

The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds

Core Course 2 Essay

The Gulf of Tonkin

The System Worked

The Guns and Butter Trap

A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War

War with China

Lessons of the Vietnam War covers all facets of the war from a diversity of perspectives. It teaches students how to think critically about conflict resolution in international relations. -- Teaches students how to reason ethically about moral choices. -- Sensitizes students to cultural differences. -- Written, reviewed and classroom tested by a nationwide network of Vietnam War scholars, teachers and veteran. -- Over 200 illustrations -- Discussion questions in all units.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

The U.S. Army Before Vietnam, 1953-1965, by Donald A. Carter, covers the period between the end of the Korean War and the initial deployment of ground combat troops to Vietnam. It describes the organizational and doctrinal changes the Army implemented as it attempted to digest the lessons of one conflict and to prepare the force for another. The pamphlet also discusses the service's efforts to maintain its position in national defense within the parameters of President Eisenhower's New Look strategic policy. A key issue for the Army was the question of how to prepare a force to operate on an atomic battlefield. In order to compete with the Air Force and the Navy for a diminishing defense budget, the Army had to show that it, too, was a modern, forward-thinking organization, prepared to integrate a new family of tactical atomic weapons into its organization and doctrine. The resulting experiment with the Pentomic division forced Army leaders to reexamine some of their most basic assumptions about future conflict. With the increasing influence of Communist China throughout Southeast Asia, the Army also began to pay greater attention toward counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare. President Kennedy's interest in a doctrine of flexible response and his concern for combatting Communist inspired insurrections prompted the Army to increase training in unconventional warfare and to highlight the capabilities of its developing special forces--the Green Berets. Related products: The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968-1974 -Print Paperback format is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00536-1 United States Army in World War 2, Special Studies, Manhattan, the Army, and the Atomic Bomb-Print Clothbound format can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00132-2 Building the Bombs: A History of the Nuclear Weapons Complex is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/061-000-00968-0 Vietnam War resources collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/us-military-history/battles-wars/vietn... China product collection can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/international-foreign-affairs/asia/china

Documents the origin of American involvement in the Vietnam War and how the policies in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations led to war.

A Strategy to Prevent War

America and the World

America in the World from Truman to Obama

America at the "fork in the Road" to Vietnam

The Vietnam War

The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961-1965

From a writer with long and high-level experience in the U.S. government, a startling and provocative assessment of America's global dominance. Maximalist puts the history of our foreign policy in an unexpected new light, while drawing fresh, compelling lessons for the

present and future. When the United States has succeeded in the world, Stephen Sestanovich argues, it has done so not by staying the course but by having to change it—usually amid deep controversy and uncertainty. For decades, the United States has been a power like no other. Yet presidents and policy makers worry that they—and, even more, their predecessors—haven't gotten things right. Other nations, they say to themselves, contribute little to meeting common challenges. International institutions work badly. An effective foreign policy costs too much. Public support is shaky. Even the greatest successes often didn't feel that way at the time. Sestanovich explores the dramatic results of American global primacy built on these anxious foundations, recounting cycles of overcommitment and underperformance, highs of achievement and confidence followed by lows of doubt. We may think there was a time when America's international role reflected bipartisan unity, policy continuity, and a unique ability to work with others, but Maximalist tells a different story—one of divided administrations and divisive decision making, of clashes with friends and allies, of regular attempts to set a new direction. Doing too much has always been followed by doing too little, and vice versa. Maximalist unearths the backroom stories and personalities that bring American foreign policy to life. Who knew how hard Lyndon Johnson fought to stay out of the war in Vietnam—or how often Henry Kissinger ridiculed the idea of visiting China? Who remembers that George Bush Sr. found Ronald Reagan's diplomacy too passive—or that Bush Jr. considered Bill Clinton's too active? Leaders and scoundrels alike emerge from this retelling in sharper focus than ever before. Sestanovich finds lessons in the past that anticipate and clarify our chaotic present.

Zinn's compelling case against the Vietnam War, now with a new introduction. Of the many books that challenged the Vietnam War, Howard Zinn's stands out as one of the best—and most influential. It helped sparked national debate on the war. It includes a powerful speech written by Zinn that President Johnson should have given to lay out the case for ending the war.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the United States' decision in early 1965 to escalate its involvement in Vietnam using the principles of Clausewitz as reference. The decision to escalate the U.S. commitment to the war in Vietnam was made by President Johnson over the period January to July 1965. Escalation was begun in two related phases, the first being the initiation of a sustained bombing campaign against various targets in North Vietnam. The second phase was the introduction of American combat ground forces, initially to protect the bases from which to stage the bombing raids, and then to conduct actual assault operations against Viet Cong units. The author asks the following questions: Do the theories expounded by Clausewitz over 150 years ago apply to the situation the United States faced in Vietnam? Do his military theories fit the reality of world events as the United States saw them in 1965? Could the nation have avoided the pitfalls of Vietnam if it had used Clausewitz as a guide? To assess the validity and applicability of Clausewitz to Vietnam in 1965, the author addresses three basic questions: what was the nature of the war, what was its purpose, and how was it conducted?

"If a historian were allowed but one book on the American involvement in Vietnam, this would be it." – Foreign Affairs When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most divisive conflicts in the United States, *The Irony of Vietnam* raised eyebrows.

Most students of the war argued that the United States had "stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation," as the *New York Times's* Fox Butterfield put it. But the perspective of time and the opening of documentary sources, including the Pentagon Papers, had allowed Gelb and Betts to probe deep into the decisionmaking leading to escalation of military action in Vietnam. The failure of Vietnam could be laid at the door of American foreign policy, they said, but the decisions that led to the failure were made by presidents aware of the risks, clear about their aims, knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their allies, and under no illusion about the outcome. The book offers a picture of a steely resolve in government circles that, while useful in creating consensus, did not allow for alternative perspectives. In the years since its publication, *The Irony of Vietnam* has come to be considered the seminal work on the Vietnam War.

To Build as Well as Destroy

The U.S. Army Before Vietnam, 1953–1965

Pain Management and the Opioid Epidemic

Choosing War

Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War

A History of the Vietnam War Era

Vietnam War 194 Success Secrets – 194 Most Asked Questions on Vietnam War – What You Need to Know

“[A] compelling analysis . . . A solid addition to our understanding of the Vietnam War and a president.” —Publishers Weekly The Vietnam War remains a divisive memory for Americans—partisans on all sides still debate why it was fought, how it could have been better fought, and whether it could have been won at all. In this major study, a noted expert on the war brings a needed objectivity to these debates by examining dispassionately how and why President Lyndon Johnson and his administration conducted the war as they did. Drawing on a wealth of newly released documents from the LBJ Library, including the Tom Johnson notes from the influential Tuesday Lunch Group, George Herring discusses the concept of limited war and how it affected President Johnson's decision making, Johnson's relations with his military commanders, the administration's pacification program of 1965–1967, the management of public opinion, and the “fighting while negotiating” strategy pursued after the Tet Offensive in 1968. This in-depth analysis, from a prize-winning historian and National Book Critics Circle Award finalist, exposes numerous flaws in Johnson's approach, in a “concise, well-researched account” that “critiques Johnson's management of the Vietnam War in terms of military strategy, diplomacy, and domestic public opinion” (Library Journal).

This volume chronicles RAND's involvement in researching insurgency and counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand during the Vietnam War era and assesses the effect that this research had on U.S. officials and policies. Elliott draws on interviews with former RAND staff and the many studies that RAND produced on these topics to provide a narrative that captures the tenor of the times and conveys the attitudes and thinking of those involved.

A sweeping political history of the Vietnam conflict shows how America was sucked into the wars in Southeast Asia in a well-meaning but deeply flawed attempt to stem Communist influence in the world. 35,000 first printing.

A Sino-U.S. war could take various, and unintended, paths. Because intense, reciprocal conventional counterforce attacks could inflict heavy losses and costs on both sides, leaders need options and channels to contain and terminate fighting.

Why Allies Rebel

How Wars End

Saigon at War

The United States and the Escalation in the Vietnam War

Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War

Ending the Vietnam War

South Vietnam and the Global Sixties

Since World War II, the international community has tried to insulate, limit, and resolve local conflicts. The generally poor success record has led some to conclude that multilateral organizations have failed in dealing with international conflicts, while others have argued that governments have not used these organizations effectively. Not enough thought, however, has been given to the contributions that can be made to conflict management and resolution through the use of diplomatic, political, military, and economic intervention by multilateral organizations, by unilateral action of national states, and by efforts of states acting in informal concert. This book evaluates the means that have been used to influence the course of six recent disputes, considering the costs and benefits in each case. In a broader context, it examines the relationship of local conflict to international security and considers the dilemma of providing security to small states without compromising their independence. Finally, it assesses the extent to which local wars tend to escalate and threaten the global security system.

Presents a comprehensive documentation of the steady growth of labor opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, from a few voices in a minority of unions to a majority labor position.

Argues that the failure of the United States to create successful peace settlements when ending the major wars of the twentieth century has only led to subsequent conflicts and new wars which attempt to resolve the issues of the previous war.

Helsing provides a unique perspective on the escalation of the Vietnam War. He examines what many analysts and former policymakers in the Johnson administration have acknowledged as a crucial factor in the way the United States escalated in Vietnam: Johnson's desire for both guns and butter--his belief that he must stem the advance of communism in Southeast Asia while pursuing a Great Society at home. He argues that the United States government, the president, and his key advisers in particular engaged in a major pattern of deception in how the United States committed its military force in Vietnam. He then argues that a significant sector of the government was deceived as well. The first half of the book traces and analyzes the pattern of deception from 1964 through July 1965. The second half shows how the military and political decisions to escalate influenced--and were influenced by--the economic advice and policies being given the President. This in-depth analysis will be of particular concern to scholars, students, and researchers involved with U.S. foreign and military policy, the Vietnam War, and Presidential war powers.

How Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests

Escalation of the Vietnam War. Analysis of reasons

Johnson's War/Johnson's Great Society

The Vietnam War Re-Examined

Maximalist

Thinking Through the Unthinkable

The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam

"The war in Vietnam was not lost in the field, nor was it lost on the front pages of the New York Times or the college campuses. It was lost in Washington, D.C." - H. R. McMaster (from the Conclusion) Dereliction Of Duty is a stunning new analysis of how and why the United States became involved in an all-out and disastrous war in Southeast Asia. Fully and convincingly researched, based on recently released transcripts and personal accounts of crucial meetings, confrontations and decisions, it is the only book that fully re-creates what happened and why. It also pinpoints the policies and decisions that got the United States into the morass and reveals who made these decisions and the motives behind them, disproving the published theories of other historians and excuses of the participants. Dereliction Of Duty covers the story in strong narrative fashion, focusing on a fascinating cast of characters: President Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and other top aides who deliberately deceived the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Congress and the American public. Sure to generate controversy, Dereliction Of Duty is an explosive and authoritative new look at the controversy concerning the United States involvement in Vietnam.

An examination of the political and cultural dynamism of the Republic of Vietnam until its collapse on April 30, 1975.

An examination of the history of Vietnam, events leading to the escalation of hostilities, and the role played by the United States' involvement, explores the war's impact upon twentieth century political and cultural development.

The Gulf of Tonkin: The United States and the Escalation in the Vietnam War analyzes the events that led to the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam and increased American involvement. On August 4, 1964, the captains of two American destroyers, the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy, reported that their ships were being attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. This report came on top of a previous report by the captain of the USS Maddox, indicating that he had been attacked by torpedo boats two nights earlier. The text introduces readers to the historiography of these incidents and how the perception of the events changed over time. The attacks, which were collectively called the Gulf of Tonkin incident, are presented in the context not only of the Vietnam War but also of the Cold War and U.S. government powers, enabling students to understand the events' full ramifications. Using essential primary documents, Tal Tovy provides an accessible introduction to a vital turning point in U.S. and international affairs. This book will be useful to all students of the Vietnam War, American military history, and foreign policy history.

The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine

Defiant Local Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars

From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam

LBJ and Vietnam

The Lessons of the Vietnam War

The Origins of the Vietnam War

Antiwarriors

Finalist for the Pulitzer Prize (Biography) A New York Times bestseller, this “epic and elegant” biography (Wall Street Journal) profoundly recasts our understanding of the Vietnam War. Praised as a “superb scholarly achievement” (Foreign Policy), *The Road Not Taken* confirms Max Boot’s role as a “master chronicler” (Washington Times) of American military affairs. Through dozens of interviews and never-before-seen documents, Boot rescues Edward Lansdale (1908–1987) from historical ignominy to “restore a sense of proportion” to this “political Svengali, or ‘Lawrence of Asia’ ” (The New Yorker). Boot demonstrates how Lansdale, the man said to be the fictional model for Graham Greene’s *The Quiet American*, pioneered a “hearts and minds” diplomacy, first in the Philippines and then in Vietnam. Bringing a tragic complexity to Lansdale and a nuanced analysis to his visionary foreign policy, Boot suggests Vietnam could have been different had we only listened. With contemporary reverberations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, *The Road Not Taken* is a “judicious and absorbing” (New York Times Book Review) biography of lasting historical consequence.

Drug overdose, driven largely by overdose related to the use of opioids, is now the leading cause of unintentional injury death in the United States. The ongoing opioid crisis lies at the intersection of two public health challenges: reducing the burden of suffering from pain and containing the rising toll of the harms that can arise from the use of opioid medications. Chronic pain and opioid use disorder both represent complex human conditions affecting millions of Americans and causing untold disability and loss of function. In the context of the growing opioid problem, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) launched an Opioids Action Plan in early 2016. As part of this plan, the FDA asked the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to convene a committee to update the state of the science on pain research, care, and education and to identify actions the FDA and others can take to respond to the opioid epidemic, with a particular focus on informing FDA's development of a formal method for incorporating individual and societal considerations into its risk-benefit framework for opioid approval and monitoring.

The Definitive Account Many other authors have written about what they thought happened -- or thought should have happened -- in Vietnam, but it was Henry Kissinger who was there at the epicenter, involved in every decision from the long, frustrating negotiations with the North Vietnamese delegation to America's eventual extrication from the war. Now, for the first time, Kissinger gives us in a single volume an in-depth, inside view of the Vietnam War, personally collected, annotated, revised, and updated from his bestselling memoirs and his book *Diplomacy*. Here, Kissinger writes with firm, precise knowledge, supported by meticulous documentation that includes his own memoranda to and replies from President Nixon. He tells about the tragedy of Cambodia, the collateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the disagreements within the Nixon and Ford administrations, the details of all negotiations in which he was involved, the domestic unrest and protest in the States, and the day-to-day military to diplomatic realities of the war as it reached the White House. As compelling and exciting as Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August*, *Ending the Vietnam War* also reveals insights about the bigger-than-life personalities -- Johnson, Nixon, de Gaulle, Ho Chi Minh, Brezhnev -- who were caught up in a war that forever changed international relations. This is history on a grand scale, and a book of overwhelming importance to the public record.

U.S. Labor and the Viet-Nam War

American Tragedy