

The Moral Judgment Of The Child

In judging the moral status of an action, adult observers consider not only the outcome of the action but the actor's mental state at the time of action. For example, accidental harms are excused, and failed murder attempts are punished. The studies presented here take a cognitive neuroscience approach to theory of mind, the capacity for mental state reasoning, in moral judgment. Study 1 suggests that moral judgment in the mature state depends on both a process for encoding mental states (e.g., beliefs) and a process for integrating mental states with other morally relevant information (e.g., outcomes); neural evidence is provided for these separate component processes. Study 2 provides neural evidence for a third cognitive process for theory of mind in moral judgment--spontaneous theory of mind in the absence of any reference to the agent's mental state. Studies 1 and 2 revealed the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) to be the most selective in the encoding, integration, and spontaneous inference of mental states for moral judgment. The activation patterns associated with these processes were observed to have distinct functional profiles, to occur at distinct time points in the stimulus, and for distinct components of the stimulus. The roles of the left TPJ, precuneus, and medial prefrontal cortex are also discussed. Study 3 shows that selectively disrupting activity in the RTPJ results in a pattern of moral judgments that relies less on beliefs and more on outcomes, supporting (1) a causal role for the RTPJ in processing beliefs and (2) the contribution of functionally dissociable mechanisms for processing distinct features of actions. Together, these studies suggest not only that moral judgment may best be described as the product of multiple mechanisms, i.e. operating over outcomes and mental states, but also that theory of mind for moral judgment is not a single unitary process.

Originally published in 1955, this book covers most of the problems of moral philosophy but concentrates on two of them: the criterion of right action and the nature of moral judgment. Rejecting Utilitarianism, it shows how principles of moral obligation may be unified under Kant's formula of treating people as ends-in-themselves. This formula is interpreted in terms of a new, naturalistic theory of moral obligation. Throughout the book the social reference of ethics is emphasized and moral obligation is discussed in relation to rights, justice, liberty and equality.

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

This long-awaited two-volume set constitutes the definitive presentation of the system of classifying moral judgment built up by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates over a period of twenty years. Researchers in child development and education around the world, many of whom have worked with interim versions of the system, indeed, all those seriously interested in understanding the problem of moral judgment, will find it an indispensable resource. Volume 1 reviews Kohlberg's stage theory, and the by-now large body of research on the significance and utility of his moral stages. Issues of reliability and validity are addressed. The volume ends with detailed instructions for using the forms in Volume 2. Volume 2, in a specially-designed, user-friendly format, includes three alternative functionally-equivalent forms of the scoring system.

The Moral Judgment of the Child - Primary Source Edition

Psychological Perspectives on Morality, Ethics, and Decision-Making

Constraint Areas and the Moral Judgment of Children

A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment

Making Moral Judgments

Measuring the Development of Sociomoral Reflection

Empathy's centrality to morality is heavily debated. Many religious and philosophical traditions have favoured empathy, sympathy, or compassion as key to moral thought, conduct, or motivation. This collection brings together original papers in philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, and neuroscience to give a comprehensive overview of the issue, and includes an extensive survey of empathy and empathy-related emotions. It is distinctive in focusing on the moral import of empathy and sympathy.

This volume brings together philosophical perspectives on emotions, imagination and moral reasoning with contributions from neuroscience, cognitive science, social psychology, personality theory, developmental psychology, and abnormal psychology. The book explores what we can learn about the role of emotions and imagination in moral reasoning from psychopathic adults in the general community, from young children, and adolescents with callous unemotional traits, and from normal child development. It discusses the implications for philosophical moral psychology of recent experimental work on moral reasoning in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. Conversely, it shows what cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have still to learn from philosophical perspectives on moral reasoning, moral reflection, and moral responsibility. Finally, it looks at whether experimental methods used for researching moral reasoning are consistent with the work in social psychology and with philosophical thought on adult moral reasoning in everyday life. The volume's wide-ranging perspectives reflect the varied audiences for the volume, from students of philosophy to psychologists working in cognition, social and personality psychology, developmental psychology, abnormal psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.

*The Moral Judgment Of The Child*Routledge

"This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and considers how moral concepts are comparable to mental states by combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology and cognitive science. Through analysis of empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Parks draws on a decade of empirical

research to reveal that referents of individuals' moral judgements vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which combines cognitive structures and emotions and reflects a new form of moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location. This text will benefit researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in the philosophy of psychology, applied social psychology, and moral development more broadly. Those interested in cognitive psychology, ethics philosophy, and moral theory will also benefit from the volume"---.

Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious

An Introduction to Ethics

Does The Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System?

Sentimental Rules

How We Make Moral Judgments

Readings in Contemporary Meta-ethics

Shaun Nichols' theory is that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgement, in that the norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms.

How many times do we hear the statement 'It's not for me to judge'? It conveys one of the most popular ideas of our time: that to make judgements of others is essentially wrong. In this classic text, the renowned moral philosopher Mary Midgely turns a spotlight on the ever popular stance in society that we should not make moral judgements on others. Guiding the reader through the diverse approaches to this complex subject, she interrogates our strong beliefs about such things as the value of freedom that underlie our scepticism about making moral judgements. She shows how the question of whether or not we can make these judgements must inevitably affect our attitudes not only to the law and its institutions but also to events that occur in our daily lives, and suggests that mistrust of moral judgements may be making life even harder for us than it would be otherwise. The texts and philosophers discussed range from Nietzsche and Sartre to P.D. James and the Bhagavad Gita. The Bloomsbury Revelations edition includes a new preface from the author.

Originally published in 1969 this book analyzes the development of moral judgement in children and adolescents. Interviews were held with 360 children aged 7 to 17, with equal numbers of either sex. Original visual devices were planned to elicit judgements in moral areas known to be of universal significance, such as the value of life, cheating, stealing and lying. The book includes a critical survey of previous work in this field and places the research in its wider philosophical, psychological and sociological context.

Why are we disgusted when an elderly woman is robbed but sympathize with the actions of a Robin Hood? Why do acts of cruelty against a helpless kitten bother us more than does the trampling of ants? In *Ethics and Attachment: How We Make Moral Judgments*, psychoanalyst and philosopher Aner Govrin offers the attachment approach to moral judgment, an innovative new model of the process involved in making such moral judgments. Drawing on clinical findings from psychoanalysis, neuroscience and developmental psychology, the author argues that infants' experience in the first year of life provides them with the basic tools needed to reach complex moral judgments later in life. With reference to Winnicott and Bowlby, the author examines how attachments affect our abilities to apply to make moral decisions. With its wholly new ideas about moral judgments, *Ethics and Attachment* will be of great interest to ethics and moral philosophy scholars, law students, and psychoanalytic psychotherapists.

Beyond Moral Judgment

The Moral Judgment of the Child - Scholar's Choice Edition

Moral Dilemmas and Ethical Reasoning

The Psychological Basis of Moral Judgments

A Sociological Dual-Process Model of Outcomes

The Moral Judgment of the Child [by] Jean Piaget

John Mikhail explores whether moral psychology is usefully modelled on aspects of Universal Grammar.

Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.

In *Moral Judgment*, James Q. Wilson demonstrates how our judicial system has compromised its obligation to discriminate between right and wrong. Citing highly publicized verdicts, he makes an erudite case for re-examining the ethical drift of contemporary jurisprudence. Today's headlines he claims, are proof that our judicial system relentlessly subjects itself to forces that limit its capacity to resolve even the gravest moral issues: judging guilt or innocence in the most grievous capital crimes. *Moral Judgment* provides a much

needed antidote to these ambiguities, and a triumph for one of our most admired ethical scholars. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Psychology of Learning and Motivation

Public Address and Moral Judgment

Ethics and Attachment

Elements of Moral Cognition

On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment

Social Discourse and Moral Judgement

Public Address and Moral Judgment offers a critical look at the ways in which public address can enact moral codes, articulate moral judgments, and manifest ethical tensions. Each chapter carefully examines specific examples of public address for their moral dimensions, exploring how public address functions to articulate and express the ethical tensions of its time and context. The contributors highlight important and often different ways that public address works to expose problematics in ethical tensions?problematics of language and imagery, metaphor and character, genre and definition. The authors are also mindful of the tenuous relationship that exists between rhetoric and morality, between situated public address and a society's ethical foundations. The essays in **Public Address and Moral Judgment**, on topics ranging from WWII propaganda to the civil rights rhetoric of President George H. W. Bush to the photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison, consider the powerful role of public discourse in the constitution of a moral code for the American people.

Barbara Herman argues for a radical shift in the way we perceive Kant's ethics. She convincingly reinterprets the key texts, at once allowing Kant to mean what he says while showing that what Kant says makes good moral sense. She urges us to abandon the tradition that describes Kantian ethics as a deontology, a moral system of rules of duty. She finds the central idea of Kantian ethics not in duty but in practical rationality as a norm of unconditioned goodness. This book both clarifies Kant's own theory and adds programmatic vitality to modern moral philosophy.

A comprehensive yet concise introduction to central topics, debates, and techniques of moral philosophy in the analytic tradition, this volume combines a thematic, issue-oriented format with rigorous standards of clarity and precision. Thomas introduces fundamental concepts and terms, proceeding through a step-by-step exploration of five general areas of debate: the specification of moral judgment; moral judgment and the moral standard; the justification of moral judgment; logic, reasoning, and moral judgment; and moral judgment and moral responsibility. Key historical and contemporary figures in moral philosophy, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Mill, Hare, Ross, Nagel, Foot, Stevenson, and Dancy, are used effectively as a means of examining the topics themselves.

"The study which follows is an examination of the moral consciousness of a small group of young men and young women connected with the University of Wisconsin. Reasons are offered, however, for believing that the results obtained hold for a large section of the American and presumably, therefore, of European society. But no conclusions are drawn from our data as to the relation of custom and the moral code among semi-civilized or still more primitive peoples. I trust my readers will exhibit a similar conservatism with regard to inferences in the reverse direction. Some of them will doubtless approach this study with very definite views of the place of custom in primitive morality. I hope they will not allow such views to prevent them from making an impartial examination of the material here presented. Let it be assumed for the sake of argument that moral judgments are entirely unreasoned at the lower end of the scale of human existence. It will be admitted by everybody, I suppose, that they are largely, if not entirely, reasoned among the most intelligent and thoughtful members of the most highly civilized communities, laymen as well as philosophers. This being granted, nothing but actual investigation can determine how far down the scale this insight extends. The evidence adduced concerning any particular social group must therefore be allowed to stand or fall on its own merits"--Introduction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Moral Relativism

The Practice of Moral Judgment

The Moral Judgment Development of Student Policy Offenders and Nonoffenders

Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment

Moral Judgment and Decision Making

A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Theory of Mind in Moral Judgement

Essays which state the fundamentals of Jung's psychological system: "On the Psychology of the Unconscious" and "The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious," with their original versions in an appendix.

This edited work presents a unique and authoritative look at morality - its development within the individual, its evolution within society, and its place within the law. The contributors represent some of the foremost authorities in these fields, and the book represents a collection of essays presented at a symposium on social constructivism and morality.

What is moral thought and what kinds of demands does it impose? Alice Crary's book *Beyond Moral Judgment* claims that even the most perceptive contemporary answers to these questions offer no more than partial illumination, owing to an overly narrow focus on judgments that apply moral concepts (for example, "good," "wrong," "selfish," "courageous") and a corresponding failure to register that moral thinking includes more than such judgments. Drawing on what she describes as widely misinterpreted lines of thought in the writings of Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, Crary argues that language is an inherently moral acquisition and that any stretch of thought, without regard to whether it uses moral concepts, may express the moral outlook encoded in a

person's modes of speech. She challenges us to overcome our fixation on moral judgments and direct attention to responses that animate all our individual linguistic habits. Her argument incorporates insights from McDowell, Wiggins, Diamond, Cavell, and Murdoch and integrates a rich set of examples from feminist theory as well as from literature, including works by Jane Austen, E. M. Forster, Tolstoy, Henry James, and Theodor Fontane. The result is a powerful case for transforming our understanding of the difficulty of moral reflection and of the scope of our ethical concerns.

This fascinating new book examines diversity in moral judgements, drawing on recent work in social, personality, and evolutionary psychology, reviewing the factors that influence the moral judgments people make. Why do reasonable people so often disagree when drawing distinctions between what is morally right and wrong? Even when individuals agree in their moral pronouncements, they may employ different standards, different comparative processes, or entirely disparate criteria in their judgments. Examining the sources of this variety, the author expertly explores morality using ethics position theory, alongside other theoretical perspectives in moral psychology, and shows how it can relate to contemporary social issues from abortion to premarital sex to human rights. Also featuring a chapter on applied contexts, using the theory of ethics positions to gain insights into the moral choices and actions of individuals, groups, and organizations in educational, research, political, medical, and business settings, the book offers answers that apply across individuals, communities, and cultures. Investigating the relationship between people's personal moral philosophies and their ethical thoughts, emotions, and actions, this is fascinating reading for students and academics from psychology and philosophy and anyone interested in morality and ethics.

Moral Judgement

Moral Judgments as Educated Intuitions

The Moral Judgment of the Child

Reading Minds for Moral Judgement

Critical Studies in Ethical Tensions

Empathy and Morality

First Published in 1999. Readers will find in this book no direct analysis of child morality as it is practised in home or school life or in children's societies. It is the moral judgment that we propose to investigate, not moral behaviour or sentiments. With this aim in view, a large number of children from the Geneva and Neuchatel schools were questioned and held conversations with them, similar to those we had had before on their conception of the world and of causality. The present volume contains the results of these conversations.

This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research in social and cognitive psychology. The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue that causal models are the canonical representational medium underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts. Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws, which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions. Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by the consequences of those actions than some normative standards would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory studies that suggest that values influence what captures our attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts. Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral characters in children, and Reyna and Casilla offer a memory-based account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence. Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al. chapters. The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay of hot and cold cognition. They examine the relationship between recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally, Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral. They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve out the moral domain a priori might be dubious.

This 1967 book aims to develop an ethical theory which remedies the defects of Utilitarianism while recognising the values upon which Utilitarians have insisted.

This book deals with moral dilemmas and the development of ethical reasoning in two senses. First, the editor focuses on dilemmas, both real and hypothetical, which require moral judgments. The "Heinz dilemma," part of Kohlberg's scoring system for level of moral development, is in some cases used as a point of departure for discussion. Problems with a particular dilemma as a scoring item are examined in detail, along with problems generated by similar dilemmas for moral reasoning in everyday life. Those who study moral reasoning and its development are in somewhat of a dilemma as they attempt to integrate information from the domains of philosophy and psychology. These essays investigate domain-specific issues in varied cultural settings, and across genders and age ranges for what have been proposed as universals in moral judgment, as well as formulate theories that reflect both empirical evidence and logical process. The essays show a conception of human nature as inherently social, as well as a healthy respect for the problems or dilemmas which human sociality carries in its wake. Some of these problems are theoretical, such as those having to do with the moral

reasoning or the classic issues of values justification. Other problems are practical, such as those having to do with distributive justice or methods of moral education. This volume will shed light on the process of resolving dilemmas within philosophy and psychology.

A Study of the Relationship Between the Moral Judgment of the Teacher and the Moral Atmosphere in the Classroom

Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning

Collected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 9 (Part 1)

The Moral Judgment Of The Child

Moral Maturity

Socialization, Moral Judgment, and Action

The traditional production measure of moral judgment has been the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), which uses hypothetical moral dilemmas to elicit moral judgment. However, the MJI dilemmas have been criticized as artificial and may not be entirely appropriate for children, certain cultures, and practical moral situations. This unique volume utilizes and evaluates a new production measure of moral judgment, the Sociomoral Reflection Measure -- Short Form (SRM-SF), which substitutes brief stimulus materials and evaluative questions for the moral dilemma technique. The authors report that the SRM-SF exhibits an impressive degree of reliability and validity and is quicker to administer and score than other available measures. To illustrate these findings, this book offers the resources needed for the assessment of the Kohlbergian stage of moral judgment using the SRM-SF. These resources include: an up-to-date review of research and theory, a group-administrable questionnaire, an efficient scoring manual, and self-training exercises in assessment. Psychometrically sound and practical, the SRM-SF has the potential to become the leading moral judgment measure of the 90s.

How does culture affect action? This question has long been framed in terms of a means vs ends debate—in other words, do cultural ends or cultural means play a primary causal role in human behavior? However, the role of socialization has been largely overlooked in this debate. In this book, Vila-Henninger develops a model of how culture affects action called “The Sociological Dual-Process Model of Outcomes” that incorporates socialization. This book contributes to the debate by first providing a critical overview of the literature that explains the limitations of the sociological dual-process model and subsequent scholarship—and especially work in sociology on “schemas”. It then develops a sociological dual-process model of moral judgment that formally explains Type I processes, Type II processes, and the interaction between Type I and Type II processes. The book also expands sociological dual-process models to include a temporal dimension—the “Sociological Dual-Process Model of Outcomes”. Finally, the book integrates a theory of socialization into the sociological dual-process model and creates empirical indicators that confirm Vila-Henninger’s theorization and contribute to the literature on measures of dual-process models.

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book.

An argument that moral reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment through episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Rationalists about the psychology of moral judgment argue that moral cognition has a rational foundation. Recent challenges to this account, based on findings in the empirical psychology of moral judgment, contend that moral thinking has no rational basis. In this book, Hanno Sauer argues that moral reasoning does play a role in moral judgment—but not, as is commonly supposed, because conscious reasoning produces moral judgments directly. Moral reasoning figures in the acquisition, formation, maintenance, and reflective correction of moral intuitions. Sauer proposes that when we make moral judgments we draw on a stable repertoire of intuitions about what is morally acceptable, which we have acquired over the course of our moral education—episodes of rational reflection that have established patterns for automatic judgment foundation. Moral judgments are educated and rationally amenable moral intuitions. Sauer engages extensively with the empirical evidence on the psychology of moral judgment and argues that it can be shown empirically that reasoning plays a crucial role in moral judgment. He offers detailed counterarguments to the anti-rationalist challenge (the claim that reason and reasoning play no significant part in morality and moral judgment) and the emotionist challenge (the argument for the emotional basis of moral judgment). Finally, he uses Joshua Greene's Dual Process model of moral cognition to test the empirical viability and normative persuasiveness of his account of educated intuitions. Sauer shows that moral judgments can be automatic, emotional, intuitive, and rational at the same time.

Five Central Problems of Moral Judgement

Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10

The Grounds of Moral Judgement

The Moral Judgment of Th Child

Moral Judgment and the Moral Point of View

The Measurement of Moral Judgement: Volume 2, Standard Issue Scoring Manual