

Soviet Counterinsurgency In The Soviet Afghan War

In December, 1979 the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan and has been involved in a counterinsurgency ever since. This study looks at one aspect of that conflict, Soviet airpower. Using the case study format it examines some doctrinal tenets that drive the Soviet's use of airpower and specifically how they are employing their assets in Afghanistan. By viewing their tactics and choices of weapons, Western observers can learn a great deal about the Soviet military's capabilities. The study concludes with some of the lessons that have emerged from this conflict.

The Soviet Union failed to deny sanctuary to the Mujahideen because it deployed an inadequate force to Afghanistan, but more importantly, it proved unable to counteract international support for the insurgency. The Soviet Union invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979 intending to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state. Afghanistan's fledgling communist government lacked the legitimacy or strength to suppress the growing Mujahideen insurgency. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen as initially planned, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped Soviet 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Mujahideen quickly recognized the imprudence of engaging the Soviets conventionally, and embarked upon a guerrilla campaign that leveraged both internal and transnational sanctuary in order to rest, rearm, refit, train, receive medical attention, and recruit and organize reinforcements. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. Despite tactical innovations and the ad hoc development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the Soviets lacked the troop strength and composition necessary to eliminate internal Mujahideen sanctuary in the mountains, or to interdict transnational aid and sanctuary. Afghanistan's terrain was simply too rugged and difficult for the Soviet Union to rely on air interdiction and its relatively small counterinsurgency force to adequately deny physical sanctuary or infiltration routes within the country. Soviet efforts to deny internal sanctuary drove the Mujahideen across the border into Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, Iran. This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations.

Performance and Consequences : the Strategic Threat of Religious Extremism and Moscow's Response

The Bear Went Over the Mountain

Primordial Violence: German War On The Soviet Partisans

A Comparison of the Soviet Union and the United States in Afghanistan

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Brutalisation

The Soviet's Use of Airpower in a Counterinsurgency Campaign

In Nazi eyes, the Soviet Union was the "wild east," a savage region ripe for exploitation, its subhuman inhabitants destined for extermination or heloty. An especially brutal dimension of the German army's eastern war was its anti-partisan campaign. This conflict brought death and destruction to thousands of Soviet civilians, and has been held as a prime example of ordinary German soldiers participating in the Nazi regime's annihilation policies. Ben Shepherd enters the heated debate over the wartime behavior of the Wehrmacht in a detailed study of the motivation and conduct of its anti-partisan campaign in the Soviet Union. He investigates how anti-partisan warfare was conducted, not by the generals, but by the far more numerous, average Germans serving as officers in the field. What shaped their behavior was more complex than Nazi ideology alone. The influence of German society, as well as of party and army, together with officers' greening yet diverse experience of their environment and enemy, made them perceive the anti-partisan war in varied ways. Reactions ranged from extreme brutality to relative restraint; some sought less to terrorize the native population than to try to win it over. The emerging picture does not dilute the suffering the Wehrmacht's eastern war inflicted. It shows, however, that properly judging ordinary Germans' role in that war is more complicated than is indicated by either wholesale condemnation or wholesale exoneratiion. This valuable study offers a nuanced discussion of the diversity of behaviors within the German army, as well as providing a compelling exploration of the war and counterinsurgency operations on the eastern front.

Two interesting studies on the Russian military provide unique and thought-provoking information: The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military and Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya. The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military - Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian federation has deployed forces for three different large-scale combat operations. These three operations-Chechnya 1994, Chechnya 1999, and Georgia 2008-were conducted facing in each operation, a differently structured opponent. As a result of these different structures, Russian forces were required to conduct both Combat Arms Maneuver and Counter Insurgency. This full spectrum of combat operations provides sufficient material to determine if the military of the Russian Federation has developed a new Russian way of warfare, or if Russian forces are still conducting operations utilizing the same methods as their Soviet predecessors. The determination of a new Russian way of war will be made at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. As Russia continues to gain wealth from the sale of energy and attempts to expand influence globally, understanding the capabilities and weaknesses of the Russian military will become more important. CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * Importance and Scope of the Study * Primary and Secondary Research Questions * Soviet Way of War * Doctrine * Manning * Policy * Background: Turnof of the Post Soviet Army * CHAPTER 2 - FIRST CHECHEN WAR * Prelude to War: Political Maneuvers and Buildup * Russian Threats Prior to Armed Conflict * Russian Military Preparation * Invasion * Fall of Grozny * Initial Attack * Siege and Fall * Russian Counterinsurgency * Aftermath * CHAPTER 3 - SECOND CHECHEN WAR * Prelude to War: de facto Chechen Independence * Russian Reaction to the Conflict in Dagestan * Political Maneuvers * Russian Military Buildup * Military Developments * Russian Invasion * Russian Siege of Grozny * Fall of Grozny * Russian Counterinsurgency * Techniques * Aftermath * CHAPTER 4 - GEORGIAN WAR * Prelude to War * Russian and Georgian Political Maneuvering * Build-up of Forces and Border Skirmishes * Initiation of Hostilities * Georgian Strategy * Russia's Strategy * Ground Forces * South Ossetia Action * Abkhazia Action * Air Force * Operational Challenges * Aftermath * Political * Economic * CHAPTER 5 - SUMMARY OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY * How Russian Forces Developed to fit the Operational Environment * Creation of New Doctrine and TTPs to Meet Operational Needs * Russian Organizational Development * Smaller Force * Conscription * Kontraktniki * Utilization of Soviet Doctrine and TTPs to Meet Operational Needs * Lack of Modernity * Russian Response to a Potential Threat * Conclusion * A Post-Soviet Way of War? Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya - In this era of peacekeeping, an equally valid argument, however, can be made for the early and preventative use of force. Applying firm and decisive military force prior to the onset of hostilities can often serve to deter the potential aggressor. Crudely expressed, spilling a little blood today may preclude spilling a lot tomorrow. When dealing with those who don't share the same liberal beliefs towards conflict resolution, exhaustive diplomatic maneuverings, sanctions and warnings are interpreted as weakness and lack the persuasive power of a resolute, though limited, use of force. In the first Russian military involvement in Chechnya (October 1994-September 1996), we saw a sloppy mixture of these two approaches. Russian tanks crossed into Chechnya in December 1994 to "establish constitutional order in Chechnya and to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia." This drastic step was first in a series of increasingly forceful and largely unsuccessful attempts to remove Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev from power.

Security force assistance is central to the counterinsurgency campaign of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome will hinge on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces. This report provides an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces.

Long Goodbye

Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime

U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World

Soviet Counterinsurgency Operations and the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement - Selections from the Secret Police Archives

The Soviet Experience

The German Army and Soviet Partisans

As Russia wages a twenty-first century war against the very existence of a Ukrainian state and nation, reanimating Soviet-era propaganda that portrayed Ukrainians as Nazi collaborators and fascists, the experiences of the Ukrainian nationalist underground before, during, and after the Second World War gain new significance. While engaged in a decades-long struggle against the Ukrainian nationalist movement and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and lasting into the mid-1950s, Soviet counterinsurgency forces accumulated a comprehensive and extensive archive of documents captured from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the UPA. Volodymyr Watrowsky and Lubomyr Luciuk have curated and carefully annotated a selection of these documents in Enemy Archives, providing primary sources the Soviet authorities collected and deemed useful for better understanding their opponents and so securing their destruction, a campaign that ultimately failed. The documents seized from the insurgents and Soviet analysts of them shed light on a wide range of experiences in the underground: how the movement struggled to maintain discipline and morale, how it des with suspected informers, and how it resisted the ruthless Soviet state, laying the foundations for the continuing Ukrainian struggle against foreign domination.

"This book offers the first analysis of the brutalisation paradigm in counter-insurgency warfare. Minimising the use of force and winning over the population's opinion is said to be the cornerstone of success in modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Yet, this tells only one side of the story. Drawing upon primary data collected during interviews with eyewitnesses of the Second Russian-Chechen War, as well as from secondary sources, this book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of the long-neglected logic underpinning brutalisation-centred COIN campaigns. It offers a comprehensive systematisation of the brutalisation paradigm and challenges the widespread assumption of brutalisation as an underperforming paradigm of COIN warfare. It shows that, although appalling, brutalisation-centred measures can deliver success. The book also outlines a stigmatised yet widely deployed set of COIN measures and provides critical insights into how Western military blueprints can be improved without compromising important moral and ethical requirements. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, military and strategic studies, Russian politics, and International Relations".

The North Caucasus region has been a source of instability for the past several centuries. Most recently, Chechen aspirations to achieve full independence after the break-up of the Soviet Union led to two disastrous wars. While the active phase of the Chechen conflict ended in 2000 - more than a decade ago -- the underlying social, economic, and political issues of the region remain. A low-level insurgency continues to persist in the North Caucasus region, with occasional terrorist attacks in the Russian heartland. There are few reasons to expect any substantial improvement in the situation for years to come. Chechnya functions as a de facto independent entity. Islamist influence in Dagestan is growing, terror attacks continue, and the rest of the North Caucasus requires massive pre-emptive Russian security services to keep the situation under control. Preventing the North Caucasus from slipping back into greater instability requires tackling corruption, cronyism, discrimination, and unemployment -- something the Kremlin has so far not been very willing to do. "Small wars" in the Caucasus resonated as far away as Boston, MA, and more international attention and cooperation is necessary to prevent the region from blowing up.

Defiant Partners in Counterinsurgency Wars

The Soviet-Afghan War

An Operational Assessment of the Campaign

Echoes of the Past

Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

The Guerrilla War in Lithuania and Western Ukraine, 1944-1953

The aim of this paper is to determine the presence or absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The development of these central themes should contribute to the secondary goals of the paper; first, to establish a fuller basis of comparison than is currently used in examination of Soviet and Soviet-advised counterinsurgent campaigns, and second, to add some historical depth to the developing body of work on Soviet counterinsurgency. This should allow for some useful generalizations about the Soviet approach to counterinsurgent warfare to be derived. Counterinsurgency became a preoccupation of the U.S. military during the late fifties and early sixties. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam sustained interest in counterinsurgency and new challenges to U.S. interests in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have renewed attention to issues of counterinsurgency in the eighties. Although the insurgents (primarily the Central Asian Basmachi), and comparative surveys of the counterinsurgency campaigns of the Soviets in Afghanistan and various Soviet allies fighting insurgents since 1975. For the purpose of establishing the patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency the limited number of cases in the first two approaches is too narrow. Although the third approach examines more cases, it mixes dissimilar cases and blurs distinctions between Soviet methods of counterinsurgency and the methods of Soviet advised militaries fighting insurgencies.

This research effort reviews the Soviet military's involvement in Afghanistan from four general, perspectives: (1) systemic problems inherent in the Soviet military culture, (2) the use of surprise, (3) operational maneuver and the preeminence of aviation and (4) employment of mines and chemical weapons as an extension of maneuver warfare. This paper concludes that the lessons of this war have been learned by the Russians. There is every reason to believe that they can achieve the level of doctrinal changes required to be successful in future "local" interventions. It must be accompanied, however, by corresponding socio-military reform.

Combines political theory and knowledge of counter-insurgency warfare

Counterinsurgency and Soviet Force Structure

The Blind Leading the Blind

Russia, the West, and Military Intervention

United States and Soviet Special Operations

The Soviet-Afghan War: Another Look

Cold War Lithuania

The rules of engagement in the third world are as structured as a ballet. This volume examines how US and Soviet foreign policies address Guerrilla warfare in the third world and gives a broad strategic analysis of low-intensity conflict objectives and constraints. Twenty-eight contributions. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands*Cambridge University Press*

In terms of Clausewitz' paradoxical trinity, the German counter insurgency in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union 1941-1944, did not achieve a sense of balance. The second two legs of the trinity, the play of chance and probability and the element of subordination, were subverted by primordial violence and enmity. Clausewitz offers his paradoxical trinity as a viable framework for analyzing the inherent complexities of warfare. The three interdependent, dynamic aspects of the trinity must be balanced against each other if a successful plan for war is to prevail. Additionally, Clausewitz addresses the dynamics of insurgencies and counter insurgencies. With these two analytical frameworks, an examination of a specific campaign becomes plausible. The German efforts to thwart the partisan uprising in the occupied territories of the Eastern Front from 1941-1944 reflected the interplay of the Clausewitz triad. Primordial violence was imbued in the German people as a result of National Socialist indoctrination. The play of chance and probability reflected the largely successful active and passive measures employed by the German armed forces behind German lines in the east. The element of subordination was manifested in the pernicious Nazi policies and directives that inevitably dictated the conduct of the armed forces. As a result of Hitler's imbalanced, irrational eastern strategy and sequent war on the partisans, primordial violence, enmity, and hatred superseded the other two legs of the trinity. Hitler's unlimited political and military objectives ultimately were incompatible with the German Army's ability to pragmatically prosecute the eastern war and pacify the population that supported the partisan resistance.

Fighting in the Mountains and Among the People

Strategy, Organizations, and Terrain

A Superpower's Inability to Deny Insurgent Sanctuary

Russian Organizational Learning in the Context of the Afghanistan and Chechnya Counterinsurgencies - Soviet Military History, Operational Art, World War II, Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia

Counterinsurgency Warfare and Brutalisation, the Second Russian-Chechen War

Enemy Archives

Analysing policy documents from nine counterinsurgency wars, Elias asks why powerful militaries have difficulty managing local partners. Revealing a critical political dynamic in military interventions, this book will appeal to academics and policymakers addressing counterinsurgency issues in foreign policy, security studies and political science.

Soviet counterinsurgency officers assembled a comprehensive archive documenting the ideological worldview, operational structures, and activities of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Vatrovych and Luciuk have curated a selection of these documents that challenges prejudices about who these Ukrainian nationalists were, whom they fought, and why.

A critical examination of the Soviet military's role in the 1979-1989 War in Afghanistan presents the Russian way of how the war occurred while chronicling its major battles and operations and offering insight into Soviet tactics and strategy. Simultaneous.

Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military and Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya - Putin, Grozny, Chechen and Georgian War, South Ossetia, Abkhazia

War in the Wild East

American and Soviet Approaches to Third World Clients and Insurgents

The Second Russian-Chechen War

How a Superpower Fought and Lost

National Armed Resistance and Soviet Counterinsurgency

Why did the USSR linger so long in Afghanistan? What makes this account of the Soviet-Afghan conflict both timely and important is its focus on the factors that prevented the Soviet leadership from ending a demoralizing and costly war and on the long-term consequences for the Soviet Union and the region.

This book investigates the Soviet response to nationalist insurgencies between 1944 and 1953 in the regions the Soviet Union annexed after the Nazi-Soviet pact.

This project analyzes the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan from April of 2002 to December of 2007 and why the United States made mistakes similar to those of the Soviet Union during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. This research aims to show that the United States made mistakes similar to those of the Soviet Union due to the strategy and organization of the U.S. military and the harsh terrain of Afghanistan itself. The Soviet Union's initial strategy utilized a relatively small commitment. The strategy allowed the military to organize in such a way to hold the infrastructure of the country but not the rural areas where the Mujahedeen operated. The harsh terrain of Afghanistan made operating in and controlling the rural areas very difficult. As such, the insurgents were able to control the rural areas and population and force the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. The initial strategy of the U.S. military was one which committed a very small amount of troops, less than 3000. This limited number of troops influenced the organization of the military to hold on to key infrastructure in the country but did not allow the U.S. to spread its control to the country side. The rough terrain of Afghanistan provided insurgent fighters safe havens while also hampering U.S. efforts to operate outside of the cities and control the rural areas.

Together the three variables help show why the war in Afghanistan deteriorated and why similar mistakes were made.

A Case Study of the Guerrilla Wars in Lithuania and Western Ukraine, 1944-1953

The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World

A Study

The Russian Way of War

Comparing Soviet and US Counterinsurgency Doctrine & Strategy in Afghanistan

Soviet Counterinsurgency

[Includes 12 maps and 4 tables] In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars. Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.

*Russia, like the United States, has experienced its struggles with counterinsurgency warfare. In Afghanistan, the Russian General Staff chose to approach the operation with a violently offensive mindset. This mindset prevented them from achieving their desired outcomes because they initially alienated the populace they needed to succeed. Then, when they realized their approach was not achieving the desired outcomes, they made only minor adjustments to their approach because they did not view this as a significant challenge to their military model. Then, when presented a similar situation in Chechnya, instead of approaching the operation using the lessons learned from Afghanistan, the General Staff chose to use the same violent tactics employed during the invasion of Afghanistan. This monograph seeks to understand this phenomenon. This monograph is applicable to the United States in that it demonstrates that a nation must not become wedded to a specific approach in order to succeed in future war. During the post-Vietnam era, the United States chose to put aside the lessons learned from counterinsurgency warfare and focus on a comfortable and conventional form of warfare. It seems America is doing the same thing again with respect to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, by focusing on evading such wars altogether. Introduction * Research Question * Hypothesis * Methodology * Theoretical Approach * Development of Soviet and Russian Operational Art and Way of War * Development of Operational Art After the Russo-Japanese War * Marxist-Leninist War * World War I and the Offense * North Atlantic Treaty Organization Expansion * Impact of Nuclear Weapons * Interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia * Russian General Staff * Case Study: Afghanistan, 1979 - 1989 * Lead Up to War * Lead Up and Conduct of War * Lessons of War * Case Study: First and Second Chechen Wars (1994-1996, 1999-2010) * First Chechen War (1994-96) * Lessons of the First Chechen War * Second Chechen War (1999 - 2010) * Lessons of the Second Chechen War * Conclusion*

*Nearly eight years since initiating combat operations in Afghanistan, the United States and our allies are witnessing first-hand the difficulty of denying sanctuary to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Similar to the Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan War, today's insurgents are leveraging mountainous terrain and international borders to survive against a superpower's counterinsurgency efforts. As the United States prepares to shift focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, it behooves us to incorporate lessons learned from the Soviet-Afghan War in order to adequately shape our force and equipment, evolve counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine, and integrate the elements of national power to deny insurgent sanctuary. I chose to study the Soviet efforts to deny the Mujahideen sanctuary because I believe sanctuary denial is a critical requirement for our success in the current fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Soviet Union did not anticipate a decade-long fight against the Mujahideen when it invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in December 1979. Determined to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating political-military situation in its newest client state, the Soviet Union conducted a coup de main modeled after successful interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The Soviet leadership believed that "... the mere presence of Soviet forces would serve to 'sober up' the Mujahideen...," and enable the DRA's communist government to suppress the insurgency. Failing to appreciate the will of the Mujahideen to resist foreign invaders, the Soviets miscalculated the nature of the war into which they entered. Instead of simply providing security, logistics, and combat support for DRA forces fighting the Mujahideen, the conventionally structured, trained, and equipped 40th Army assumed the lead against a determined guerrilla opponent in some of the most rugged terrain on earth. The Soviets properly identified sanctuary as a critical requirement for the Mujahideen to wage a successful resistance, but never effectively deprived the insurgency of this requirement. The Soviet Union failed to deny sanctuary to the Mujahideen because it deployed an inadequate force to Afghanistan, but more importantly, it proved unable to counteract international support for the insurgency. PREFACE * INTRODUCTION * SANCTUARY DEFINED * GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT * DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURE * BACKGROUND * POLITICAL TURMOLL IN THE 1970s * SOVIET COMBAT OPERATIONS * INADEQUATE FORCE TO DENY SANCTUARY * COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN * CONCLUSIONS * NOTES * APPENDIX A - AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS * APPENDIX B - AFGHANISTAN 3-D RELIEF MAP * APPENDIX C - MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS OF AFGHANISTAN * BIBLIOGRAPHY*

Soviet Counterinsurgency Operations and the Ukrainian Nationalist Movement - Selections from the Secret Police Archives

Soviet Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Strategy in Afghanistan

Why Allies Rebel

Russia's Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus

The aim of this thesis is to determine the presence o r absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in Soviet military thought and compares the Soviet counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan. The thesis concludes that a pattern of Soviet counterinsurgency evolved in spite of the absence of an official doctrine but that the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan may inspire changes in the Soviet approach to counterinsurgency. (R)

A detailed and carefully structured study of Soviet/Russian attitudes and responses to military interventions. It explores cases from the Gulf War in 1990 to the intervention led by Western states in Libya in 2011.

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. This monograph examines the imperial Russian campaign to quell rebellion in the North Caucasus from 1801 to 1864 and the Bolshevik suppression of the Basmachi rebellion in Central Asia from 1919 to 1933. The Caucasian War and the Basmachi rebellion featured Muslim insurgent movements that exploited inaccessible mountain terrain and relied upon the local population for recruitment and support. The imperial Russians and Bolsheviks both struggled to adapt their civil and military operations to defeat an elusive enemy and establish control over a diverse and fractured society. The analysis tests the effectiveness of key principles found in population-centric counterinsurgency theory and doctrine in the imperial Russian and Bolshevik counterinsurgent operations. The evidence suggests that the synchronization of military and nonmilitary operations through unity of effort contributed to Russian and Bolshevik victory by isolating the insurgent forces from the local population. The analysis also identifies significant risks and costs associated with employing a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. The September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States precipitated lengthy wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Following brief periods of conventional warfare, both conflicts transitioned into extended stages of unconventional warfare. The rise of insurgents with close ties to the local population in Afghanistan and Iraq challenged the conventionally oriented US military, and forced a reconsideration of US Army doctrine. Officers examined past counterinsurgency campaigns to determine the proper way to adapt to the new threat. Under the leadership of the Commander General of the Combined Arms Center, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, the US Army created a population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine in 2006 that emphasized the integration of military and nonmilitary operations. The US Army's new doctrine drew upon the counterinsurgency theories of French officers in the Algerian Civil War, and diverse historical examples from the British in Malay to the Soviets in Afghanistan to inform the US Army's approach to the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies. Despite the breadth of historical analysis of past "small wars," officers and students of military affairs largely ignored two examples of counterinsurgencies with striking similarities to the United States' post-September 11th conflicts. The imperial Russian Caucasian campaigns from 1801 to 1864 and the Soviet suppression of the Basmachi rebellion from 1918 to 1933 provide excellent case studies to test the counterinsurgency principles codified in the 2006 publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Both conflicts pitted predominately-ethnic Russian forces against Muslim insurgent movements that relied upon the support of their local populations in largely inaccessible mountainous regions. The organization and doctrine of the imperial Russian and Soviet militaries centered on conventional warfare, and both armies struggled to adapt to the unconventional tactics of their adversaries. The Russians and the Bolsheviks each enjoyed significant military and economic advantages over their enemies, but often failed to translate their superior might into tactical success.

Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency

Artillery and Counterinsurgency

The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

Soviet Advisors, Counter-insurgency and Nation-building in Afghanistan

On Internal War

Soviet Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 1979-1989

counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heated excitement and terror. Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

In part 1 these essays are concerned with aspects of Soviet policy including political relations, Soviet perceptions of insurgency and counter-insurgency, and the Soviet use of propaganda in the Third World. Part 2 is concerned with economic affairs, and the last section includes case-studies.

A Superpower's Inability to Deny Insurgent Sanctuary - Report on Soviet Combat Operations, Inadequate Force, Countering International Support for the Mujahideen, Demographics

The Soviet Army, Counterinsurgency, and the Afghan War

A Case Study of Soviet Counterinsurgency

Imperial Russian and Early Soviet Population-Centric Counterinsurgency - Caucasian War and Bolshevik Suppression of Basmachi Rebellion (1919-1933)

Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan [Illustrated Edition]