Nuclear Strategy In The Modern Era Regional Powers And International Conflict Princeton Studies In International History And Politics

In 2007 two former U.S. secretaries of state, a defense secretary, and a former senator wrote persuasively in the Wall Street Journal that the time had come to move seriously toward a nuclear-free world. Almost two years later, the Global Zero movement was born with its chief aim to rid the world of such weapons once and for all by 2030. But is it realistic or even wise to envision a world without nuclear weapons? More and more people seem to think so. Barack Obama has declared “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” But that is easier said than done. Michael O’Hanlon places his own indelible stamp on this critical issue, putting forth a “friendly skeptic’s case for nuclear disarmament.” Calls to “ban the bomb” are as old as the bomb itself, but the pace and organization of nonproliferation campaigns have picked up greatly recently. The growing Global Zero movement, for example, wants treaty negotiations to begin in 2019. Would this be prudent or even feasible in a world that remains dangerous, divided, and unpredictable? After all, America’s nuclear arsenal has been its military trump card for much of the period since World War II. Pursuing a nuclear weapons ban prematurely or carelessly could alarm allies, leading them to consider building their own weapons—the opposite of the intended effect. O’Hanlon clearly presents the dangers of nuclear weapons and the advantages of disarmament as a goal. But even once an accord is in place, he notes, temporary suspension of restrictions may be necessary in response to urgent threats such as nuclear “cheating” or discovery of an advanced biological weapons program. To take all nuclear options off the table forever strengthens the hand of those that either do not make that pledge or do not honor it. For the near term, traditional approaches to arms control, including dismantling existing bomb inventories, can pave the way to make a true nonproliferation regime possible in the decades ahead.

In The Fragile Balance of Terror, the foremost experts on nuclear policy and strategy offer insight into an era rife with more nuclear powers. Some of these new powers suffer domestic instability, others are led by pathological personalist dictators, and many are situated in highly unstable regions of the world?a volatile mix of variables. The increasing fragility of deterrence in the twenty-first century is created by a confluence of forces: military technologies that create vulnerable arsenals, a novel information ecosystem that rapidly transmits both information and misinformation, nuclear rivalries that include three or more nuclear powers, and dictatorial decision making that encourages rash choices. The nuclear threats posed by India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea are thus fraught with danger. The Fragile Balance of Terror, edited by Vipin Narang and Scott D. Sagan, brings together a diverse collection of rigorous and creative scholars who analyze how the nuclear landscape is changing for the worse. Scholars, pundits, and policymakers who think that the spread of nuclear weapons can create stable forms of nuclear deterrence in the future will be forced to think again. Contributors: Giles David Arceneaux, Mark S. Bell, Christopher Clary, Peter D. Feaver, Jeffrey Lewis, Rose McDermott, Nicholas L. Miller, Vipin Narang, Ankit Panda, Scott D. Sagan, Caitlin Talmadge, Heather Williams, Amy Zegart

From the author of the classic The Wizards of Armageddon and Pulitzer Prize finalist comes the definitive history of American policy on nuclear war—and Presidents’ actions in nuclear crises—from Truman to Trump. Fred Kaplan, hailed by The New York Times as “a rare combination of defense intellectual and pugnacious reporter,” takes us into the White House Situation Room, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s “Tank” in the Pentagon, and the vast chambers of Strategic Command to bring us the untold stories—based on exclusive interviews and previously classified documents—of how America’s presidents and generals have thought about, threatened, broached, and just barely avoided nuclear war from the dawn of the atomic age until today. Kaplan’s historical research and deep reporting will stand as the permanent record of politics. Discussing theories that have dominated nightmare scenarios from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Kaplan presents the unthinkable in terms of mass destruction and demonstrates how the nuclear war reality will not go away, regardless of the dire consequences.

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.

President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983

Nuclear Weapons and Strategy

Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence

The Making of International Strategy

Nuclear Logics

Nuclear Modernization in the 21st Century

"This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."--Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities--real or imagined--are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter's new introduction to the work shows how Schelling's framework--conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction--still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.

The author explores how the US government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, leading it to build far more - and far more destructive - warheads than are needed for war-planning purposes. She explores how this could have happened and the consequences for defense policy.

An exploration of the nuclear arms race and the dangers arising with the advent of “limited warfare” After the development of the atomic bomb in 1945, Americans became engaged in a "new kind of war" against totalitarianism. Enemies and objectives slipped out of focus, causing political and military aims to mesh as a struggle to contain communism both at home and abroad encompassed civilians as well as soldiers. In matters relating to Vietnam, Central America, and the nuclear arms race, the domestic and foreign dimensions of each issue became inseparable. Policymakers in Washington had to formulate strategies dictated by "limited war" in their search for peace. Contributors to this volume demonstrate the multifaceted nature of modern warfare. Robert H. Ferrell establishes the importance of studying military history in understanding the post-World War II era. On Vietnam, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., gives an intriguing argument regarding the U. S. Army; George C. Herring examines how America's decisions in 1954 assured deepened involvement; and Captain Mark Clodfelter uncovers new evidence concerning "Linebacker I." On the home front, Robert F. Burk analyzes the impact of the Cold War on the battle for racial justice; Charles DeBenedetti puts forth a challenging interpretation of the antiwar movement; and James C. Schneider provides perspective on the relationship between the Vietnam War and the Great Society. On Central America, two writers downplay communism in explaining the region's troubles. Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., fits the Nicaraguan revolution in the long span of history, and Thomas M. Leonard shows how the Reagan administration forced Costa Rica to side with the United States's anti-Sandinista policy. Finally, on nuclear strategy, Donald M. Snow offers a thought-provoking assessment of the "star wars" program, and Daniel S. Papp recommends measures to promote understanding among the superpowers. These essays demonstrate that the making of foreign policy is immensely complicated, not subject to easy solution or to simple explanation. Despite these complexities, the central objective of policymakers remained clear: to safeguard what was perceived as the national interest.

“The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy quickly established itself as a classic when it first appeared in 1981. This edition makes it even better, incorporating as it does new material about the Cold War and up-dating to include subsequent developments. Filled with insights and penetrating analysis, this volume is truly indispensable.” —Robert Jervis, Author of How Statesmen Think "Freedman and Michaels have written a thorough and thought-provoking guide to nuclear strategy. The authors analyze the causes of both wise and unwise strategic decisions in the past and thereby shine a bright light on dilemmas we face in our common nuclear future." —Scott Sagan, Stanford University, USA “With its comprehensive coverage, clear and direct language, and judicious summaries of a vast literature, this new and wholly revised edition of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy will be essential reading for any student of nuclear history, strategic studies, or contemporary international relations.” —Matthew Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK “Sir Lawrence Freedman’s The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy has been the first port of call for three generations of academics and policy-makers wanting to familiarize themselves with the subject matter. The success of this book could have led Professor Freedman to satisfy himself with regular updates or afterwords. But the tireless author is now gracing us with an entirely revised edition of his masterpiece nearly forty years after its initial publication, taking into account findings from archives and declassified documents. At the same time, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy remains true to its original purpose and spirit: an easy to read manual, light with footnotes, focusing on policy rather than on theory, and thus the best possible introduction to an arcane subject. In an era when nuclear strategy issues seem to be becoming relevant again, its historical scope and breadth will make its reading or re-reading even more useful – if only because knowing about the absurdity of the Cold war arms race is a prerequisite if one does not want to repeat its mistakes.” —Bruno Tertrais, Deputy Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France “This updated and improved edition of the classic text on the evolution of nuclear strategy is a must read for anyone attempting to understand the nuclear predicament and where it is heading. Impressive in every respect!” —T.V. Paul, James McGill Professor of International Relations, McGill University, Canada, and the author of The Traditon of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons “After the end of the Cold War, we hoped for a world in which nuclear weapons would have ‘low salience’, or might even disappear into virtual, non-assembled arsenals. Alas, they are coming to the fore again. With changes in political context and technology, it is thus pressing that ‘the Bible’ on the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy should be updated. Lawrence Freedman’s great classic has been admirably updated with the help of Jeff Michaels. The work, just as its previous editions, thus remains the definitive and authoritative point of reference on nuclear strategy in the twenty-first century.” —Beatrice Heuser, Chair of International Relations, University of Glasgow, Scotland First published in 1981, Lawrence Freedman's The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been completely rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, and covering all nuclear powers.

Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East

Nuclear Statecraft

Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

Regional Powers and International Conflict

New Technologies and Challenges to Sustainable Peace

Real-world Nuclear Deterrence

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern EraRegional Powers and International ConflictPrinceton University Press

A leading international security strategist offers a compelling new way to "think about the unthinkable." The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons—a luxury that we can no longer indulge. It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age. In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises. Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.

This collection examines the extent to which nuclear weapons modernization has become a significant point of concern and consideration in international security. Recent statements and substantial investments by nuclear weapon possessor states in the upkeep and modernization of their nuclear postures – particularly the United States, Russia and China – illustrate a return of primacy and the salience of nuclear forces in international politics. The upgrading of systems, the introduction of new capabilities, the intermingling of new technologies, and the advancement of new strategic models, are all indicative of their elevation in importance and reliance. With contributions from leading thinkers in the nuclear weapons domain, this book elucidates the global strategic and policy implications such modernization efforts by the above-mentioned states will have on international security. In unpacking and conceptualizing this developing source of potential (in)security and tension, the collection not only provides a technical context, but also frames the likely effects modernization could have on the relations between these nuclear weapon powers and the larger impact upon efforts to curb nuclear weapons – both in terms of horizontal and vertical proliferation. The chapters have been arranged so as to inform a variety of stakeholders, from academics to policy-makers, by connecting analytical and normative insights, and thereby, advancing debates pertaining to where nuclear modernization sits as a point of global security consternation in the 21st century.

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The Brink

The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy

Seeking the Bomb

Why Strategic Superiority Matters

Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century

We are at a critical juncture in world politics. Nuclear strategy and policy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda, and issues ranging from a nuclear Iran to the global zero movement are generating sharp debate. The historical origins of our contemporary nuclear world are deeply consequential for contemporary policy, but it is crucial that decisions are made on the basis of fact rather than myth and misapprehension. In Nuclear Statecraft, Francis J. Gavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear revolution. On the basis of recently declassified documents, Gavin reassesses the strategy of flexible response, the influence of nuclear weapons during the Berlin Crisis, the origins of and motivations for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how to assess the nuclear dangers we face today. In case after case, he finds that we know far less than we think we do about our nuclear history. Archival evidence makes it clear that decision makers were more concerned about underlying geopolitical questions than about the strategic dynamic between two nuclear superpowers. Gavin's rigorous historical work not only tells us what happened in the past but also offers a powerful tool to explain how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Nuclear Statecraft provides a solid foundation for future policymaking.

'...Lawrence Freedman has provided a masterly account of the evolution of nuclear strategic thought which is steeped in scholarship, elegantly written, and comprehensive in scope.' Edward M.Spiers, Times Higher Education Supplement

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China's Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Backward Glances, Forward Looks

Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics

Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age

Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War

New, Updated and Completely Revised

The New Nuclear Disorder

In numerous crises after World War II—Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan Straits, and the Middle East—the United States resorted to vague threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese military action. On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged in nuclear saber-ratling. Using declassified documents and other sources, this volume examines those crises and compares the decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear threats with the commonly accepted logic of nuclear deterrence and coercion. Rejecting standard explanations of our leader's logic in these cases, Betts suggests that U.S. presidents were neither consciously bluffing when they made nuclear threats, nor prepared to face the consequences if their threats failed. The author also challenges the myth that the 1950s was a golden age of low vulberability for the United Stateas and details how nuclear parity has, and has not, altered conditions that gave rise to nuclear blackmail in the past.

Providing a historical context to US nuclear strategy modifications, this paper details how the new triad is founded on previous efforts to secure nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union and counter-proliferation capabilities against WMD-proliferant adversaries.

“ An informative and often enthralling book…in the appealing style of Tom Clancy ” (Kirkus Reviews) about the 1983 war game that triggered a tense, brittle period of nuclear brinkmanship between the United States and the former Soviet Union. What happened in 1983 to make the Soviet Union so afraid of a potential nuclear strike from the United States that they sent mobile ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) into the field, placing them on a three-minute alert Marc Ambinder explains the anxious period between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1982 to 1984, with the “ Able Archer ’ 83 ” war game at the center of the tension. With astonishing and clarifying new details, he recounts the scary series of the close encounters that tested the limits of ordinary humans and powerful leaders alike. Ambinder provides a comprehensive and chilling account of the nuclear command and control process, from intelligence warnings to the composition of the nuclear codes themselves. And he affords glimpses into the secret world of a preemptive electronic attack that scared the Soviet Union into action. Ambinder ’ s account reads like a thriller, recounting the spy-versus-spy games that kept both countries—and the world—in check. From geopolitics in Moscow and Washington, to sweat-caked soldiers fighting in the trenches of the Cold War, to high-stakes war games across NATO and the Warsaw Pact, “ Ambinder ’ s account of a serious threat of global annihilation…is spellbinding…a masterpiece of recent history ” (Publishers Weekly, starred review). The Brink serves as the definitive intelligence, nuclear, and national security history of one of the most precarious times in recent memory and “ shows the consequences of nuclear buildups, sometimes-careless language, and nervous leaders. Now, more than ever, those consequences matter ” (USA TODAY).

Looking at how nuclear deterrence has actually worked rather than how it should theoretically work, Coleman and Siracusa put the problems of nuclear deterrence over the past sixty years into global context and apply historical lessons to the current state of world affairs.

US Nuclear Policy for the Twenty-First Century

A Technical, Policy, and Strategic Review

History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age

Arms and Influence

The Bomb

Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy

Exploring what we know—and don’t know—about how nuclear weapons shape American grand strategy and international relations The world first confronted the power of nuclear weapons when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The global threat of these weapons deepened in the following decades as more advanced weapons, aggressive strategies, and new nuclear powers emerged. Ever since, countless books, reports, and articles—and even a new field of academic inquiry called “security studies”—have tried to explain the so-called nuclear revolution. Francis J. Gavin argues that scholarly and popular understanding of many key issues about nuclear weapons is incomplete at best and wrong at worst. Among these important, misunderstood issues are: how nuclear deterrence works; whether nuclear coercion is effective; how and why the United States chose its nuclear strategies; why countries develop their own nuclear weapons or choose not to do so; and, most fundamentally, whether nuclear weapons make the world safer or more dangerous. These and similar questions still matter because nuclear danger is returning as a genuine threat. Emerging technologies and shifting great-power rivalries seem to herald a new type of cold war just three decades after the end of the U.S.-Soviet conflict that was characterized by periodic prospects of global Armageddon. Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy helps policymakers wrestle with the latest challenges. Written in a clear, accessible, and jargon-free manner, the book also offers insights for students, scholars, and others interested in both the history and future of nuclear danger.

The first systematic look at the different strategies that states employ in their pursuit of nuclear weapons Much of the work on nuclear proliferation has focused on why states pursue nuclear weapons. The question of how states pursue nuclear weapons has received little attention. Seeking the Bomb is the first book to analyze this topic by examining which strategies of nuclear proliferation are available to aspirants, why aspirants select one strategy over another, and how this matters to international politics. Looking at a wide range of nations, from India and Japan to the Soviet Union and North Korea to Iraq and Iran, Vipin Narang develops an original typology of proliferation strategies—hedging, sprinting, sheltered pursuit, and hiding. Each strategy of proliferation provides different opportunities for the development of nuclear weapons, while at the same time presenting distinct vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent states from doing so. Narang delves into the crucial implications these strategies have for nuclear proliferation and international security. Hiders, for example, are especially disruptive since either they successfully attain nuclear weapons, irrevocably altering the global power structure, or they are discovered, potentially triggering serious crises or war, as external powers try to halt or reverse a previously clandestine nuclear weapons program. As the international community confronts the next generation of potential nuclear proliferators, Seeking the Bomb explores how global conflict and stability are shaped by the ruthlessly pragmatic ways states choose strategies of proliferation.

"This book reassesses the nuclear strategy of the United States. Despite the appearance of continuity in official policy statements, views within the Obama and Trump administrations and across the larger defense policy community have diverged on the appropriate role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, the optimal nuclear strategy for advancing U.S. interests, force structure requirements, and critical related issues. This is an important book for security and strategic studies and should be of interest to both scholars and practitioners in political science and international relations, especially in the field of nuclear weapons policy"--

"This excellent book offers a novel typology of nuclear postures and a theory that explains why states adopt certain postures but not others, before assessing the consequences of postures for deterrence. An exemplary blend of theory and qualitative and quantitative evidence, its conclusions have wide-ranging implications for the way we think about nuclear deterrence."--Alexander Downes, George Washington University "This book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the nuclear challenges that we currently face. Narang argues that the theories developed during the Cold War cannot explain the nuclear policies of regional powers. To fill this important gap, he convincingly lays out three distinct nuclear postures available to regional powers and he questions conventional wisdom to show that a state's nuclear posture significantly influences its deterrence effect."--Charles Glaser, George Washington University "With the end of the Cold War, the nuclear postures of countries other than the United States and Russia are increasingly central for theory and policy, but our knowledge of these postures has been deficient. Showing that states have tailored their stances to different internal and external situations, Narang combines rich empirical research and careful theorizing to add greatly to our understanding of deterrence."--Robert Jervis, author of "The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution" "Vipin Narang's study of the causes and consequences of different states' nuclear weapons postures is a significant contribution to the literature on the causes of military doctrine, as well as the literature on both nuclear proliferation and deterrence theory. Narang's interpretations are novel and thought provoking, and he skillfully combines rich case study work with sophisticated statistical tests."--Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University

Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice

The Fragile Balance of Terror

Nuclear Superiority

Clausewitz and Escalation

U.S. Nuclear Strategy in the New World Order

Nuclear Logics examines why some states seek nuclear weapons while others renounce them. Looking closely at nine cases in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen finds two distinct regional patterns. In East Asia, the norm since the late 1960s has been to forswear nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which makes no secret of its nuclear ambitions, is the anomaly. In the Middle East the opposite is the case, with Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya suspected of pursuing nuclear-weapons capabilities, with Egypt as the anomaly in recent decades. Identifying the domestic conditions underlying these divergent paths, Solingen argues that there are clear differences between states whose leaders advocate integration in the global economy and those that reject it. Among the former are countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, whose leaders have had stronger incentives to avoid the political, economic, and other costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. The latter, as in most cases in the Middle East, have had stronger incentives to exploit nuclear weapons as tools in nationalist platforms geared to helping their leaders survive in power. Solingen complements her bold argument with other logics explaining nuclear behavior, including security dilemmas, international norms and institutions, and the role of democracy and authoritarianism. Her account charts the most important frontier in understanding nuclear proliferation: grasping the relationship between internal and external political survival. Nuclear Logics is a pioneering book that is certain to provide an invaluable resource for researchers, teachers, and practitioners while reframing the policy debate surrounding nonproliferation.

This book discusses the nuclear dilemma from various countries' points of view: from Japan, Korea, the Middle East, and others. The final chapter proposes a new solution for the nonproliferation treaty review.

This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds—including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author's experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.

The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characterisitics and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest--twenty-two essays--are new. The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

The 'new Triad' and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

The Second Nuclear Age

Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace

Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation

Vietnam, Central America, and Nuclear Strategy

This book began as a personal effort to comprehend the effect of nuclear weapons on the current era and its international system. Nuclear weapons have not merely revolutionized the military sphere but havce also left their stamp on the world order. Knowledge of the basic principles of nuclear strategy has become a prerequisite to understanding world events. Consequently, no country can remain indifferent to nuclear strategy or can consider itself exempt from its implications. The very importance of the subject precludes the assumption of a narrow technical or military point of view. Political, historical, moral, and even religious implications must be considered. Nuclear War and Nuclear Peaceserves as an introduction to the study of modern strategy within the framework of international relations, as well as a basic account for laymen to the intricacies of modern strategy and its ramifications. It deals with a wide range of problems: deterrence and its implications; surprise; and preemptive and preventative attack. The problems of quantities of nuclear weapons, limitations of war (conventional, tactical and strategic), and proliferation of nuclear weapons are also discussed. In the end Harkabi introduces alternate global approaches and the problem of coalitions in the nuclear era. By focusing on disarmament and arms control; peace in the shadow of terror; and stability of the international system and peace research he brings relevance to his study in terms of the current world climate. Many books and articles have been published on nuclear strategy. Most have been designed to formulate strategic policies to suit the needs of particular countries and influence their policy. Most books on nuclear strategy have appeared in the United States, with strategic prescriptions for the United States. This book will be of tremendous interest to anyone wishing to understand the major problems of our contemporary world from a global perspective.

The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.

In the twenty-first century, the United States confronts an international system of great complexity and shifting security challenges. Among these challenges are those posed by nuclear weapons. Instead of becoming obsolete or being marginalized by the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons have become more important to present and future international stability and peace but the relationship is paradoxical. On one hand, the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states with unsettled grievances or hegemonic ambitions threatens to destabilize local balances of power and set off regional arms races. In addition, the possible acquisition by terrorists of nuclear weapons or fissile materials creates a threat that may be 'beyond deterrence' according to hitherto accepted concepts. On the other hand, nuclear weapons in the hands of other states can contribute to stable deterrence and help to prevent nuclear proliferation to international miscreants. Certain cases loom large in the short run that highlight this book's relevance, including the possible acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons by Iran and the continuing tensions created by North Korea's nuclear arsenal. The Obama 'pivot' of national security and defense emphasis to Asia reflects not only the growing economic importance of that region, but also the growing number of security dilemmas in a region that is already awash in nuclear forces. The management of nuclear crises and even the possible need to terminate nuclear wars before they expand beyond a single region are among the possible challenges facing future U.S. and allied policy makers and military leaders.

Steiner analyzes how and why Brodie's understanding of weapons of unparalleled explosive force led him to posit the need for revolutionary strategic thinking in broadminded analytic method and in the focus upon cities as nuclear targets. He shows the tremendous effect Brodie's work had on the intellectual climate in which policy is determined, particularly in his frequent combatting of conventional wisdom.

Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation

Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age

Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance

The Foreign and Domestic Dimensions of Modern Warfare

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

My Journey at the Nuclear Brink

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.

The United States and the Soviet Union could drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals below the levels prescribed by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The end of the Cold War and the transformation of international security now under way present the United States with opportunities to develop new policies based on greater international cooperation with the Soviet Union and other major powers. This new book describes two lower levels of nuclear forces that could be achieved, as well as other related measures to improve international security.

Drawing on years of experience analyzing defense strategy, the author advocates for renewed U.S. attention to nuclear weapons and discusses how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate.

My Journey at the Nuclear Brink is a continuation of William J. Perry's efforts to keep the world safe from a nuclear catastrophe. It tells the story of his coming of age in the nuclear era, his role in trying to shape and contain it, and how his thinking has changed about the threat these weapons pose. In a remarkable career, Perry has dealt firsthand with the changing nuclear threat. Decades of experience and special access to top-secret knowledge of strategic nuclear options have given Perry a unique, and chilling, vantage point from which to conclude that nuclear weapons endanger our security rather than securing it. This book traces his thought process as he journeys from the Cuban Missile Crisis, to crafting a defense strategy in the Carter Administration to offset the Soviets' numeric superiority in conventional forces, to presiding over the dismantling of more than 8,000 nuclear weapons in the Clinton Administration, and to his creation in 2007, with George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and Henry Kissinger, of the Nuclear Security Project to articulate their vision of a world free from nuclear weapons and to lay out the urgent steps needed to reduce nuclear dangers.

NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020

The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship

Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy

A Skeptic's Case for Nuclear Disarmament

Whole World on Fire

The War That Must Never Be Fought

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states—and potential future ones—manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. Vipin Narang identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, he offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. Narang then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others. Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.

Nuclear weapons, once thought to have been marginalized by the end of the Cold War, have returned with a vengeance to the centre of US security concerns and to a world bereft of the old certainties of deterrence. This is a major analysis of these new strategic realities. The George W. Bush administration, having deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, now points to a new nuclear "Axis of Evil": Iran and North Korea. These nations and other rogue states, as well as terrorists, may pose key threats because they are "beyond deterrence", which was based on the credible fear of retaliation after attack. This new study places these and other developments, such as the clear potential for a new nuclear arms race in Asia, within the context of evolving US security policy. Detailing the important milestones in the development of US nuclear strategy and considering the present and future security dilemmas related to nuclear weapons this is a major new contribution to our understanding of the present international climate and the future. Individual chapters are devoted to the key issues of missile defenses, nuclear proliferation and Israel’s nuclear deterrent. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, international relations and US foreign policy.

This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.

Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy

Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy

Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy

Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era