

Americas Strategy In Southeast Asia From Cold War To Terror War

This book undertakes an in-depth examination of the dynamics of commitment in U.S.-Southeast Asia strategy. Drawing on cases including the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Washington’s pivot to Asia amid China’s growing regional role, it constructs an original balance of commitment model to explain continuity and change in U.S.-Southeast Asia policy. Balance of commitment goes beyond balance of power approaches to explains how translating Southeast Asia’s importance in U.S. thinking into actual commitments has proven challenging for policymakers as it requires simultaneously calibrating adjustments to power shifts, threat perceptions and resource extraction. The book applies the balance of commitment approach to several practical case studies, based on hundreds of conversations with policymakers and experts in the United States and Southeast Asia, personal experiences across nearly two decades and primary and secondary source material across a half-century. The findings suggest that the challenges of U.S. commitment to the region are rooted not simply in differences between administrations or divergences in outlook between Washington and regional capitals, but tough balancing acts for U.S. policymakers in domestic politics and wider foreign policy. As such, shaping U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia and calibrating and sustaining commitment requires not just appreciating Southeast Asia’s significance, but committing to the region in ways that manage structural aspects of U.S. thinking, capabilities and resourcing. Southeast Asia has become a hotbed of strategic rivalry between China and the United States. China is asserting its influence in the region through economic statecraft and far-reaching efforts to secure its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, while the United States has promoted a Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy that explicitly challenges China’s expanding influence—warning other countries that Beijing is practicing predatory economics and advancing governance concepts associated with rising authoritarianism in the region. In this timely volume, leading experts from Southeast Asia, Australia, and the United States assess these great power dynamics by examining the strategic landscape, domestic governance trends, and economic challenges in Southeast Asia, with the latter focusing especially on infrastructure. Among other findings, the authors express concern that U.S. policy has become too concentrated on defense and security, to the detriment of diplomacy and development, allowing China to fill the soft power vacuum and capture the narrative through its signature Belt and Road Initiative. The COVID-19 pandemic has only increased the policy challenges for Washington as China recovers faster from the outbreak, reinforcing its already advantaged economic position and advancing its strategic goals as a result. As the Biden administration begins to formulate its strategy for the region, it would do well to consider these findings and the related policy recommendations that appear in this volume. Much is at stake for U.S. foreign policy and American interests. Southeast Asia includes two U.S. allies—Thailand and the Philippines—important security partners like Singapore, and key emerging partners such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Almost 42,000 U.S. companies export to the 10 countries that comprise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), supporting about 600,000 jobs in the United States, but America’s economic standing is increasingly at risk. The groundbreaking account of U.S. clandestine efforts to use Southeast Asian Buddhism to advance Washington’s anticommunist goals during the Cold War How did the U.S. government make use of a “Buddhist policy” in Southeast Asia during the Cold War despite the American principle that the state should not meddle with religion? To answer this question, Eugene Ford delved deep into an unprecedented range of U.S. and Thai sources and conducted numerous oral history interviews with key informants. Ford uncovers a riveting story filled with U.S. national security officials, diplomats, and scholars seeking to understand and build relationships within the Buddhist monasteries of Southeast Asia. This fascinating narrative provides a new look at how the Buddhist leaderships of Thailand and its neighbors became enmeshed in Cold War politics and in the U.S. government’s clandestine efforts to use a predominant religion of Southeast Asia as an instrument of national stability to counter communist revolution. The Vietnam War coincided with, and in many ways caused, an enormous cultural schism in the United States. Now, as then, scholarship is divided over the efficacy of American Cold War strategy, its ability to halt the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and the role the United States should have played in the struggle for a unified, socialist Vietnam. This book represents a new historical take on the Vietnam War. After a lengthy description of the war’s historical backdrop, the book examines the origins of American involvement under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, Kennedy’s advancement toward direct conflict between the U.S. and guerrilla and regular North Vietnamese forces, and the dramatic troop buildup under Johnson. The final chapters discuss peace negotiations during Nixon’s presidency, the ultimate American failure in Indochina, and the region in the aftermath of war. Throughout, the work argues that the war was necessary and winnable under better circumstances and leadership. The book includes an extensive bibliography.

Military Basing and the U.S./Soviet Military Balance in Southeast Asia

Strategic Partnership Opportunities in Southeast Asia

Vietnam

American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century

Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam

Adapting to the American Pivot

Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-first Century

Southeast Asia is no mere strategic sideshow. For centuries, it has been geopolitically important due to the sea lanes that pass through it, its proximity to and abutment of India and China, and the resources to which it plays host. The United States should strive to shape a Southeast Asia that is at peace with itself and its neighbors; is characterized by states that are strong, independent, and prosperous; and is home to governments that are resilient, responsive, and accountable. Washington should adopt a comprehensive strategy—with security, economic, and governance pillars—to achieve those ends. Should the United States succeed, it will ensure a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its friends and allies, shore up the liberal international order, deepen prosperity at home and in Southeast Asia, and advance freedom in the region.

Talere/Forfatter: Alexander M. Haig, Edward N. Luttwak, Cecil V. Crabb, Leon Gouré, William W. Kaufmann, Noel C. Koch, Paul Seabury, Jacquelyn K. Davis, Leonard Unger, Uri Ra’anan, Jonathan T. Howe, Francis J. West, William R. Van Cleave, Dean John P. Roche, Christopher M. Lehman, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff.

The first comprehensive account of the impact of Japanese occupation on Southeast Asian economies and societies during World War II.

Complete set Since 1961 the Adelphi papers have provided some of the most informed accounts of international and strategic relations. Produced by the world renowned International Institute of Strategic Studies, each paper provides a short account of a subject of topical interest by a leading military figure, policy maker or academic. The project reprints the first forty years of papers, arranged into thematic sets. The collection as a whole provides a rich and insightful account of international affairs during a period which spans the second half of the Cold War, the fall of the communist bloc and the emergence of a new regime with the United States as the sole superpower. There is a wealth of global coverage: Four volumes on east and southeast Asia as well as individual volumes on China, Japan and Korea Particular attention is given to the Middle East, with volumes addressing internal sources of instability; geo-politics and the role of the superpowers; the Israel-Palestine conflict; and the Iran-Iraq War and the first Gulf War. There is also a volume on oil and insecurity There are also two volumes on Africa, the site of most of the world ’ s wars during the period. The IISS has obviously made a particular contribution to the understanding of military strategy, and this is reflected with material on topics such as urban and guerrilla warfare, nuclear deterrence and the role of information in modern warfare. Volumes on military strategy are complemented by approaches from other disciplines, such as defence economics. Key selling points: Early papers were only distributed by the IISS and will have achieved limited penetration of the academic market A host of major authors on a range of different subjects (eg Gerald Segal on China, Michael Leifer on Southeast Asia, Sir Lawrence Freedman on the revolution in military affairs, Raymond Vernon on multinationals and defence economics) Individual volumes will have a strong appeal to different markets (eg the volume on defence economics for economists, various volumes for Asian Studies etc)

How Will Shifts in American Foreign Policy Affect Southeast Asia?

Toward Disengagement in Asia

Economy and Society under Japanese Occupation

China and the Developing World

America and China in Southeast Asia

Withdrawal

Assessing Maritime Power in the Asia-Pacific

Arc of Containment recasts the history of American empire in Southeast and East Asia from World War II through the end of American intervention in Vietnam. Setting aside the classic story of anxiety about falling dominoes, Wen-Qing Ngoei articulates a new regional history premised on strong security and sure containment guaranteed by Anglo-American cooperation. Ngoei argues that anticommunist nationalism in Southeast Asia intersected with preexisting local antipathy toward China and the Chinese diaspora to usher the region from European-dominated colonialism to US hegemony. Central to this revisionary strategic assessment is the place of British power and the effects of direct neocolonial military might and less overt cultural influences based in decades of colonial rule. Also essential to the analysis in Arc of Containment is the considerable influence of Southeast Asian actors upon Anglo-American imperial strategy throughout the post-war period. In Arc of Containment Ngoei shows how the pro-US trajectory of Southeast Asia after the Pacific War was, in fact, far more characteristic of the wider region’s history than American policy failure in Vietnam. Indeed, by the early 1970s, five key anticommunist nations—Malaya, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia—had quashed Chinese-influenced socialist movements at home and established, with U.S. support, a geostrategic arc of states that contained the Vietnamese revolution and encircled China. In the process, the Euro-American colonial order of Southeast Asia passed from an era of Anglo-American predominance into a condition of US hegemony. Arc of Containment demonstrates that American failure in Vietnam had less long-term consequences than widely believed because British pro-West nationalism had been firmly entrenched twenty-plus years earlier. In effect, Ngoei argues, the Cold War in Southeast Asia was but one violent chapter in the continuous history of western imperialism in the region in the twentieth century.

Notes on Lessons of a Failed Strategy. p. 155.

America’s Strategy in Southeast AsiaFrom Cold War to Terror WarRowman & Littlefield Publishers

David C. Kang tells an often overlooked story about East Asia’s ‘comprehensive security’, arguing that American policy towards Asia should be based on economic and diplomatic initiatives rather than military strength.

The Economics of World War II in Southeast Asia

Under Beijing’s Shadow

From Cold War to Terror War

Singapore-America-India Relations

How American Arms and Diplomacy Failed in Southeast Asia

Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia

Elusive Balances

A quarter century after its end, the Vietnam War still divides Americans. Some, mostly on the left, claim that Indochina was of no strategic value to the United States and was not worth an American war. Others, mostly on the right, argue that timid civilian leaders and defeatists within the media fatally undermined the war effort. These "lessons of Vietnam" have become ingrained in the American consciousness, at the expense of an accurate understanding of the war itself. In this groundbreaking reinterpretation of America’s most disastrous and controversial war, Michael Lind demolishes the stale orthodoxies of the left and the right and puts the Vietnam War in its proper context -- as part of the global conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Cold War, he argues, was actually the third world war of the twentieth century, and the proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were its major campaigns. Unwilling to engage each other in the heart of Europe, the superpowers played out their contest on the Asian front, while the rest of the world watched to see which side would retreat. As Lind shows, the Soviet Union and Communist China recognized the importance of Vietnam in this struggle and actively supported the North Vietnamese regime from its earliest days, a fact that was not lost on the strategic planners within the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. Lind offers a provocative reassessment of why the United States failed in Vietnam despite the high stakes. The ultimate responsibility for defeat lies not with the civilian policy elite nor with the press but with the military establishment, which failed to adapt to the demands of what before 1968 had been largely a guerrilla war. The high costs of the military’s misguided approach in American and Vietnamese lives sapped the support of the American people for the U.S. commitment to Indochina. Even worse, the costs of the war undermined American public support for the Cold War on all fronts. Lind masterfully lays bare the deep cultural divisions within the United States that made the Cold War consensus so fragile and shows why it broke apart so easily. The consequence of U.S. military failure was thus the forfeiture of Indochina, a resurgence of American isolationism, and a wave of Soviet imperial expansion checked only by the Second Cold War of the 1980s. The New York Times has written of Michael Lind that he "defies the usual political categories of left and right, liberal and conservative." And in an era when the United States so often finds itself embroiled in prolonged and difficult conflicts -- in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq -- Lind offers a sobering cautionary tale to Americans of all political viewpoints.

Soon after the American Revolution, ?ertain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation’s political philosophy and material realities. Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history’s major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America’s stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.

After the end of the Cold War, it seemed as if Southeast Asia would remain a geopolitically stable region within the American-led order for the foreseeable future. In the last two decades, however, the re-emergence of China as a major great power has called into question the geopolitical future of the region and raised the specter of renewed great power competition. As the eminent China scholar David Shambaugh explains in Where Great Powers Meet, the United States and China are engaged in a broad-gauged and global competition for power. While this competition ranges across the entire world, it is centered in Asia. In this book, Shambaugh focuses on the critical sub-region of Southeast Asia. The United States and China constantly vie for position and influence across this enormously significant area—and the outcome of this contest will do much to determine whether Asia leaves the American orbit after seven decades and falls into a new Chinese sphere of influence. Just as importantly, to the extent that there is a global "power transition" occurring from the US to China, the fate of Southeast Asia will be a good indicator. Presently, both powers bring important assets to bear in their competition. The United States continues to possess a depth and breadth of security ties, soft power, and direct investment across the region that empirically outweigh China’s. For its part, China has more diplomatic influence, much greater trade, and geographic proximity. In assessing the likelihood of a regional power transition, Shambaugh examines how ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and its member states maneuver and the degree to which they align with one or the other power.

1960. President Eisenhower was focused on Laos, a tiny Southeast Asian nation. Washington feared the country would fall to communism, triggering a domino effect in the rest of Southeast Asia. In January 1961, Eisenhower approved the CIA’s Operation Momentum, a plan to create a proxy army of ethnic Hmong to fight communist forces in Laos. Kurlantzick shows how the brutal war lasted nearly two decades, killed one-tenth of Laos’s total population, and changed the nature of the CIA forever.

Shaping U.S.-Southeast Asia Strategy

American Foreign Policy

United States and Southeast Asia, 1945-1954

The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II

Asia Eyes America

The Evolution of American Policy in Southeast Asia

The New US Strategy towards Asia

As the Indo-Pacific emerges as the world ’ s most strategically consequential region and competition with China intensifies, the United States must adapt its approach if it seeks to preserve its power and sustain regional stability and prosperity. Yet as China grows more powerful and aggressive and the United States appears increasingly unreliable, the Indo-Pacific has become riven with uncertainty. These dynamics threaten to undermine the region ’ s unprecedented peace and prosperity. U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century offers vital perspective on the future of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on the critical roles that American allies and partners can play. Abraham M. Denmark argues that these alliances and partnerships represent indispensable strategic assets for the United States.

They will be necessary in any effort by Washington to compete with China, promote prosperity, and preserve a liberal order in the Indo-Pacific. Blending academic rigor and practical policy experience, Denmark analyzes the future of major-power competition in the region, with an eye toward American security interests. He details a pragmatic approach for the United States to harness the power of its allies and partners to ensure long-term regional stability and successfully navigate the complexities of the new era.

Where Great Powers Meet explores the global competition for power between the United States and China. Focusing on Southeast Asia, David Shambaugh looks at how ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the countries within it maneuver between the US and China and the degree to which they align with one or the other power. Not simply an analysis of the region’s place within an evolving international system, Where Great Powers Meetprovides us with a comprehensive strategy that advances the American position while exploiting Chinese weaknesses.

A narrow space of time between 1959 thru 1975 during which the West calls the Vietnam War and the Vietnamese People refer to as the American War defines what many consider the US-Vietnam Narrative. In 2011 the United States signaled to the world an unprecedented shift in strategic focus to the Pacific. The rebalancing of American National Power into a region devoid of the level of American Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) resources applied to other regions of the world has forced the reset of regional strategic norms. This paper will explore why it is in both the United States â e(tm) and Vietnam â e(tm)s national interest to improve their cooperation and partnership. Understanding Vietnamese history, geography, and culture is critical to truly understand its impact this emerging relationship. The core of this paper documents the coordinated application of the elements of National Power focusing predominantly on the military. This includes what has been implemented to date as well a strategy to enhance cooperation and stimulate meaningful engagement with Vietnam and conversely within the greater Southeast Asia Region.

This report considers how the United States should restore its forces, adjust its policies, and change its military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, all in the context of reduced resources and increased burden-sharing by allies and security partners. It assesses six alternative U.S. regional force postures that might develop over the next 15 years. Each posture is examined for the regional responses it might evoke, its performance in a variety of future contingencies, and its comparative cost. The report identifies five factors that will shape Asia’s future and America’s role in it: (1) the implosion of Soviet power and its political and security consequences, (2) the development of Japan as a global economic and technological power, (3) the primacy of economics in both domestic and international contexts, (4) the unsettled political and economic futures of the Asian communist regimes, and (5) the reconfiguration of America’s regional alliances in the context of rapid domestic political change. The authors list several policy and program initiatives designed to mitigate the potential negative effects of U.S. force posture reductions.

Arc of Containment

By More Than Providence

America’s Next Frontier in the Global War on Terrorism

Cold War Monks

Empowering Allies and Partners

A New Strategy and Fewer Forces

Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783

A better war. Over the last two decades, this term has become synonymous with US strategy during the Vietnam War’s final years. The narrative is enticingly simple, appealing to many audiences. After the disastrous results of the 1968 Tet offensive, in which Hanoi’s forces demonstrated the failures of American strategy, popular history tells of a new American military commander who emerged in South Vietnam and with inspired leadership and a new approach turned around a long stalemated conflict. In fact, so successful was

General Creighton Abrams in commanding US forces that, according to the better war myth, the United States had actually achieved victory by mid-1970. A new general with a new strategy had delivered, only to see his victory abandoned by weak-kneed politicians in Washington, DC who turned their backs on the US armed forces and their South Vietnamese allies. In a bold new interpretation of America's final years in Vietnam, acclaimed historian Gregory A. Daddis disproves these longstanding myths. Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' long Vietnamese civil war. In a riveting sequel to his celebrated Westmoreland's War, Daddis demonstrates he is one of the nation's leading scholars on the Vietnam War. Withdrawal will be a standard work for years to come.

America's strategy to combat terrorism, resulting from Al-Qaeda's 2001 attacks, falls short of its intent to defeat transnational terrorism. While the tenets of the current counterterrorism strategy were written broadly to enable global employment, this template approach proved ineffective. While focusing its efforts on dismantling terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, America neglected parts in Southeast Asia that provided sanctuary to Islamic terrorists. Such sanctuaries facilitated the regrouping, recruiting, and training of Al-Qaeda operatives to conduct subsequent attacks against America and its allies throughout the world. The central research question is: What strategy can the US employ to eliminate Al-Qaeda's influence throughout the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines? Recommended strategy changes were generated from applying a three-step analysis approach. First, analyzing the adversary established a foundation from which to develop recommendations to counter Al-Qaedas operations. Second, analyzing three Southeast Asian governments' responses to terrorist threats within their country assisted in the formulation of a counterterror strategy for the region. Finally, the analysis of the current counterterror strategy resulted in recommended adjustments to each of America's instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic--to facilitate elimination of Al-Qaeda's influence in Southeast Asia. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency.

In the years following World War II, as the United States began to focus on the global containment of communism, few regions of the world were considered as much of a potential battleground as Southeast Asia. Robert McMahon contends that policymakers exaggerated the significance of the region within the global power balance, dangerously overextending the United States and resulting in the tragedy of the Vietnam War. The first book to situate the Vietnam War in its broad, regional context, *The Limits of Empire* offers the most complete picture to date of how U.S. strategies of containment and empire-building spiraled out of control in Southeast Asia. Additionally, McMahon's analysis goes further than any previous study of U.S. security policy in Southeast Asia by following it through to the present, investigating how the demoralizing experience of Vietnam radically undermined U.S. enthusiasm for the region in a strategic sense. By conceptualizing the U.S. strategic mission as empire-building rather than merely containment, this book offers an insightful new way to understand America's failure in Vietnam--and also why this grim miscalculation did not lead to the balance-of-power catastrophe that some U.S. officials had forecasted. *The Limits of Empire* touches upon such broad theoretical concerns as the appeal of nationalist, anti-Western currents to Third World peoples; the inadequacy of empires as a means of asserting control over non-Western peoples; and the chasm between America's postwar ambitions and the sobering realization of the limits of its power.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- One: The Buddhist World and the United States at the Onset of the Cold War, 1941-1954 -- Two: Washington Formulates a Buddhist Policy, 1954-1957 -- Three: Thailand and the International Buddhist Arena, 1956-1962 -- Four: Reforming the Monks: The Cold War and Clerical Education in Thailand and Laos, 1954-1961 -- Five: Thailand and the International Response to the 1963 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam -- Six: Enforcing the Code: South Vietnam's "Struggle Movement" and the Limits of Thai Buddhist Conservatism -- Seven: Thailand's Buddhist Hierarchy Confronts Its Challengers, 1967-1975 -- Eight: The Rage of Thai Buddhism, 1975-1980 -- Conclusion: From Byoto to Kittivudho -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- X -- Y -- Z

Unraveling Vietnam

U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century

Southeast Asia

Beijing's Major Power Engagement with the Developing World

The Pacific Dimension

An American Strategy for Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia's China Challenge

A new phase in US foreign policy, in which China is viewed as a major threat to American economic and security interests, has begun under the Trump administration. The strong anti-China sentiment is accompanied by efforts to “decouple” from China. If carried too far, they will alienate allies and friends whose cooperation the US will need in order to compete with China. In the broader American foreign policy community, there is an intense ongoing debate on how strong the push-back against China should be. Both moderates and hawks agree on the need for a “tougher” approach but differ on the degree and method of toughness. No coherent strategy has been possible partly because President Trump’s thinking does not always accord with that of his own administration and partly because it is still too early in the day to come out with well-thought-out policies to support such a major change in foreign policy direction. The ongoing adjustments to global policy and strategy will therefore continue as the security focus shifts to the Indo-Pacific region. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept provides some signs of the broad direction policy may take but its vital economic dimension is still missing. There is greater recognition in Washington of the importance of Southeast Asia. Located in the middle of Indo-Pacific, it will be a contested zone between China and the US and its allies. The US will step up its public diplomacy to better promote its own narrative in Southeast Asia. Under the Trump administration, the importance of the South China Sea to the US has risen. The US will remain a powerful factor in Asia despite Trump and problems at home. China is not on an inevitable path of dominance given its own significant domestic challenges.

What are Beijing’s objectives towards the developing world and how they have evolved and been pursued over time? Featuring contributions by recognized experts, China Steps Out analyzes and explains China’s strategies in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Latin America, and evaluates their effectiveness. This book explains how other countries perceive and respond to China’s growing engagement and influence. Each chapter is informed by the functionally organized academic literature and addresses a uniform set of questions about Beijing’s strategy. Using a regional approach, the authors are able to make comparisons among regions based on their economic, political, military, and social characteristics, and consider the unique features of Chinese engagement in each region and the developing world as a whole. China Steps Out will be of great interest to students and scholars of Chinese foreign policy, comparative political economy, and international relations.

Geography encompasses everything from the local—where human beings live, work, and travel—to metageographies like nations and regions. James A. Tyner's inventive and multidisciplinary ideas on geography similarly range from the personal—his father's experience in the military during the Vietnam War—to a broad discussion of how the United States has come to exercise power through the production of geographic knowledge, in this case in Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Second World War, Southeast Asia has served as a surrogate space to further American imperial interests, which are economic, political, territorial, and moral in scope. America's Strategy in Southeast Asia contends that the construction of Southeast Asia as a geographic entity has been a crucial component in the creation of the American empire. For example, America's most blatant experience of colonial rule occurred the Philippines, America's longest war was fought in Vietnam, and most recently, some American policymakers have identified Southeast Asia as the "Second Front" in the War on Terror. Yet, America's overriding strategy in Southeast Asia and the region itself remains something of a mystery for the American populace—a "black box" in America's geographical imagination. This clear and innovative book educates readers about Southeast Asia's importance in American foreign policy.

Southeast Asia is a maritime crossroad and an arena of strategic great power interaction. The study of international politics after the Cold War has rediscovered the importance of regional interaction as the framework for understanding countries' security strategies and the great powers' impact on specific regions. A review of various theories, further, reveals the revival of geopolitics in theoretical constructions and policy formulations. This thesis reviews United States-China relations as the independent variable. The U.S. grand strategy has been consistent since the first Bush administration, namely to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. The American instruments in pursuit of its strategy are derived from its nature as a maritime power. China is a continental power that is recently expanding seaward and reemerging as East Asia's indispensable power. China's success in promoting its vision of order in maritime Southeast Asia will potentially underline America's influence. Southeast Asia's regional order, the dependent variable, is dynamic when viewed from its two dimensions: time and space. Time refers to historical cycles, while space refers to the diverse views in dealing with the major powers, i.e., regional autonomy, a balance of engagement among the great powers and, since the 1990's, stronger engagement only with Northeast Asia. This thesis argues that regional identity is the primary driver of Southeast Asia's strategy for regional order.

Security Commitments and Capabilities

Where Great Powers Meet

Buddhism and America's Secret Strategy in Southeast Asia

The Limits of Empire

Rewriting the Vietnam Narrative

America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA

Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-first Century

Contains a collection of papers produced by participants (U.S. and regional scholars and analysts) at a conference, "Asia Eyes America," held at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in May 2006. What are the implications of Asia's longer-term transformation for U.S. interests? How might change reconfigure American security requirements in the next decade and beyond? On what basis does United States reaffirm yet redefine its enduring commitment to regional order? This volume is a collaborative effort involving prominent specialists on both sides of the Pacific. The book focuses on underlying attitudes toward American power and policy, especially as viewed by strategic analysts within the region. Various contributors describe contradictory attitudes toward American power. Most states hope to deepen ties with the United States, while avoiding comprehensive envelopment in U.S. strategy. There is a tension between the preference for continued American regional involvement, while seeking to limit possibilities of highly intrusive U.S. policy interventions. Both considerations will continue to shape regional attitudes toward American power, especially U.S. military power--Publisher's description.

Singapore is America's closest security partner in Southeast Asia. The United States has decided to help India become a major world power in the 21st century, an objective that is furthered by the nuclear agreement between them. Singapore's relationship with India is an increasingly pertinent feature of Southeast Asia's political and strategic landscape. Whether these three realities, taken together, lay the basis of a triangular relationship among Singapore, America, and India is the question that this book seeks to answer. The book begins with a review of the notion of Pax Americana and goes on to describe the state of bilateral relations among the three countries as they have evolved since the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, it analyses three core issues - the Global War on Terror, the rise of China, and the agency of democracy in international relations - that play a defining role in relations among Singapore, the United States, and India. The book concludes by suggesting some directions in which these relations might move.

In this work, experts in the Soviet, American and Asian military forces have contributed individual papers dealing with the political and economic effects that the Soviet and American military presence has initiated in Southeast Asia. Topics include military strategy, presence and security.

East Asia is richer, more integrated and more stable than ever before, whilst East Asian defense spending is now roughly half of what it was in 1990 and shows no sign of increasing. There is no evidence of any Asian arms race. All countries in the region are seeking diplomatic, not military solutions with each other. Yet this East Asia reality still runs counter to a largely Western narrative that views China's rise as a threat and the region as increasingly unstable. In this important book, David C. Kang argues that American grand strategy should emphasize diplomatic and economic relations with the region, rather than military-first policies. Using longitudinal and comparative data, statistical analysis, and intensive research in selected East Asian countries, he suggests that East Asia is in sync with the American desire to share burdens and that the region may in fact be more stable than popularly believed.

American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the 21st Century

China Steps Out

Assessing Great Power Dynamics in Southeast Asia

Rivalry and Response

The Impact of American Strategic Re-Balance

The Necessary War

A Great Place to Have a War

Barack Obama's "rebalancing" or "pivot" strategy, intended to demonstrate continued US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region in a variety of military, economic, and diplomatic contexts, was launched with much fanfare in 2011. Implicit in the new strategy is both a focus on China - engagement with, and containment of - and a heavy reliance by the United States on its existing friends and allies in the region in order to implement its strategy. This book explores the impact of the new strategy on America's regional friends and allies. It shows how these governments are working with Washington to advance and protect their distinct national interests, while at the same time avoiding any direct confrontation with China. It also addresses the reasons why many of these regional actors harbour concerns about the ability of the US to sustain the pivot strategy in the long run. Overall, the book illustrates the deep complexities of the United States' exercise of power and influence in the region.

China's rise and stepped-up involvement in Southeast Asia have prompted a blend of anticipation and unease among its smaller neighbors. The stunning growth of China has yanked up the region's economies, but its militarization of the South China Sea and dam building on the Mekong River has nations wary about Beijing's outsized ambitions. Southeast Asians long felt relatively secure, relying on the United States as a security hedge, but that confidence began to slip after the Trump administration launched a trade war with China and questioned the usefulness of traditional alliances. This compelling book provides a snapshot of ten countries in Southeast Asia by exploring their diverse experiences with China and how this impacts their perceptions of Beijing's actions and its long-term political, economic, military, and "soft power" goals in the region.

Leading academics from around the world, who specialize in analysing maritime strategic issues, deliberate the impact of the American 'pivot' or 're-balance' strategy, and the 'Air-Sea Battle' operational concept, on the maritime power and posture of a number of selected states. Intending to strengthen US economic, diplomatic, and security engagement throughout the Asia-Pacific, both bilaterally and multilaterally, the re-balance stands out as one of the Obama administration's most far-sighted and ambitious foreign policy initiatives.

China's relationship with the developing world is a fundamental part of its larger foreign policy strategy. Sweeping changes both within and outside of China and the transformation of geopolitics since the end of the cold war have prompted Beijing to reevaluate its strategies and objectives in regard to emerging nations. Featuring contributions by recognized experts, this is the first full-length treatment of China's relationship with the developing world in nearly two decades. Section one provides a general overview and framework of analysis for this important aspect of Chinese policy. The chapters in the second part of the book systematically examine China's relationships with Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The book concludes with a look into the future of Chinese foreign policy.

Implications of Sino-American Strategic Competition on Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Regional Order

The ASEAN Regional Forum: Asian Security Without an American Umbrella

A Strategy for American Foreign Policy

American Military Policy and the Failure of Strategy in Southeast Asia

America's Strategy in Southeast Asia

The Art of Insurgency